Reexamining the effect of gustatory disgust on moral judgment: A multi-lab direct replication of Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz (2011) by Ghelfi, E et al.
Running head: DISGUST AND MORAL WRONGNESS JUDGMENTS 1
Reexamining the effect of gustatory disgust on moral judgment: A multi-lab direct
replication of Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz (2011)
Eric Ghelfi1, Cody D. Christopherson2, Heather L. Urry3, Richie L. Lenne4, Nicole Legate5,
Mary Ann Fischer6, Fieke M. A. Wagemans7, Brady Wiggins8, Tamara Barrett9, Michelle
Bornstein10, Bianca de Haan11, Joshua Guberman12, Nada Issa13, Joan Kim14, Elim Na15,
Justin O’Brien16, Aidan Paulk17, Tayler Peck18, Marissa Sashihara19, Karen Sheelar20, Justin
Song21, Hannah Steinberg22, & Dasan Sullivan23
1 Brigham Young University
2 Southern Oregon University
3 Tufts University
4 University of Minnesota
5 Illinois Institute of Technology
6 Indiana University Northwest
7 Tilburg University and University of Duisburg-Essen
8 Brigham Young University-Idaho
9 Utah State University
10 Tufts University
11 Brunel University
12 University of Michigan
13 Indiana University Northwest
DISGUST AND MORAL WRONGNESS JUDGMENTS 2
14 Massachusetts General Hospital
15 Boston University School of Medicine
16 Brunel University
17 Oregon College of Oriental Medicine
18 Southern Oregon University
19 Tufts University
20 Southern Oregon University
21 Tufts University
22 Pacific Graduate School of Psychology/Stanford University Doctor of Psychology
Consortium
23 Southern Oregon University
Author Note
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Eric Ghelfi, Department
of Psychology, Brigham Young University, 1001 SWKT, Provo, UT 84602. E-mail:
ericghelfi1@gmail.com
DISGUST AND MORAL WRONGNESS JUDGMENTS 3
Abstract
Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz’s (2011) influential experiment demonstrated that gustatory
disgust triggers a heightened sense of moral wrongness. We report a large-scale multi-site
direct replication of this study conducted by participants in the Collaborative Replications
and Education Project. Participants in each sample were randomly assigned to one of three
beverage conditions: bitter/disgusting, control, or sweet. Then, participants made a series of
judgments indicating the moral wrongness of the behavior depicted in each of six vignettes.
In the original study (N = 57), drinking the bitter beverage led to higher ratings of moral
wrongness than drinking the control and sweet beverages; a beverage contrast was significant
among conservative (N = 19) but not liberal (N = 25) participants. In this report, random
effects meta-analyses across all participants (N = 1,137 in k = 11 studies), conservative
participants (N = 142, k = 5), and liberal participants (N = 635, k = 9) revealed
standardized effect sizes that were smaller than reported in the original study. Some were in
the opposite of the predicted direction, all had 95% confidence intervals containing zero, and
most were smaller than the effect size the original authors could meaningfully detect. In
linear mixed-effects regressions, drinking the bitter beverage led to higher ratings of moral
wrongness than drinking the control beverage but not the sweet beverage. Bayes Factor tests
reveal greater relative support for the null hypothesis. The overall pattern provides little to
no support for the theory that physical disgust via taste perception harshens judgments of
moral wrongness.
Keywords: disgust, moral judgment
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Reexamining the effect of gustatory disgust on moral judgment: A multi-lab direct
replication of Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz (2011)
This paper presents results from a multi-lab replication of an experiment suggesting
that gustatory disgust (i.e., taste perception) can make moral judgments harsher (Eskine,
Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011). Previous studies had revealed a similar link between sensory disgust
induced by other means, such as olfactory stimulation (Schnall et al., 2008b), and judgments
of moral wrongness. Moreover, since Eskine and colleagues’ (2011) study, empirical and
conceptual work has grown around the idea that inducing perceptions of gustatory disgust is
an especially effective way of increasing the severity with which people make moral
judgments (Hellmann, Thoben, & Echterhoff, 2013; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2015).
However, a recent meta-analysis failed to replicate the association between disgust and moral
judgment (Landy & Goodwin, 2015a). To our knowledge, there are no attempts to replicate
the relation between physical disgust via taste perception and moral wrongness. The purpose
of this project is therefore to precisely estimate the effect of gustatory disgust on moral
judgment by replicating the methods used by Eskine et al. (2011).
In the 1990’s, the body of research that would eventually coalesce under the banner of
embodied cognition began taking shape (Wilson, 2002). This research proposes that
real-world thinking and problem-solving are deeply situated within sensoriperceptual
processes and are not merely cognitive processes (Anderson, 2003; Ionescu & Vasc, 2014).
For example, it has been theorized that while disgust likely evolved to steer organisms away
from pathogens, it also evolved to guide humans in their decision-making in the domains of
mate selection and morality (Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013). Other
researchers agree that the cognitive computation systems involved in pathogenic (“core”)
disgust likely overlap with the computational systems involved in perceptions of moral
disgust (Curtis & Biran, 2001; Inbar & Pizarro, 2014). Indeed, the insula plays a role in
perceptions of both pathogenic and moral disgust (Vicario, Rafal, Martino, & Avenanti,
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2017), and pathogen and moral disgust both cause activation in the levator labii muscle
region, defined as the raising of the upper lip and wrinkling of the nose (Cannon, Schnall, &
White, 2011; Chapman, 2018). Moreover, some argue that the two constructs are so closely
related that inducing incidental disgust (e.g., the smell of garbage or the taste of a bitter
drink) can amplify moral disgust and so harshen moral judgment (Inbar & Pizarro, 2014).
The idea that similar parts of the brain are activated by both physical and moral
disgust has prompted other researchers to examine how inducing a sensoriperceptual
experience of disgust can affect moral judgment more specifically (Cameron, Payne, & Doris,
2013; Case, Oaten, & Stevenson, 2012; Gill & Nichols, 2008; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom,
Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Landy & Goodwin, 2015a). Several studies suggest that olfactory
(e.g., Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012) and gustatory (e.g., Chapman, 2018; Hellmann et al.,
2013) input, for example, can affect moral judgment. In particular, these studies find that
perceptions of sensory disgust lead to harsher moral judgment across several means of
inducing disgust (Cameron et al., 2013; Eskine et al., 2011; Schnall et al., 2008b; Wheatley
& Haidt, 2005). However, a recent meta-analytic review estimated a negligible effect size of
disgust on moral judgment (d = .11 for the studies included in the meta-analysis and d =
-.01 accounting for publication bias; Landy & Goodwin, 2015a). These effect sizes were
calculated across multiple means of inducing disgust. There is no available meta-analysis of
studies using gustatory disgust inductions and no discoverable replications of the effect of
gustatory disgust on moral judgment, such as the one reported by Eskine and colleagues
(2011). As we explain in the next section, the effect sizes Eskine and colleagues found were
much larger than effect sizes found in other studies investigating similar effects. This
difference—combined with the small sample size of the study—made it an important
candidate to replicate.
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Original Study
Eskine and colleagues (2011) found that participants who drank a bitter beverage
before reading six moral vignettes judged characters’ actions more harshly than participants
who drank a sweet beverage or water. Eskine and colleagues selected a bitter drink to induce
disgust because they hypothesized that a strong bitter taste would be reliably experienced as
disgusting. A manipulation check confirmed that their sample experienced the bitter drink
(Swedish Bitters) as disgusting. In addition to the main effect of gustatory disgust on moral
judgment, politically conservative participants showed more sensitivity to the effect,
suggesting that political conservatives were more likely to be influenced by incidental
sensoriperceptual cues (i.e., gustatory disgust) when making moral judgments.
The original research (N = 57, each randomly assigned to one of three conditions; N =
54 after exclusions) yielded large, statistically significant effects (d = 1.09 and p = .001 for
the disgust group vs. the neutral control, and d = 1.22 and p = .003 for the disgust group
vs. the sweet control). Although the authors did not report the F test for the interaction
between beverage conditions and political orientation, they conducted two contrast analyses
within politically conservative and liberal subgroups. In the conservative subgroup, the
contrast between the disgust condition and the other conditions was large and statistically
significant, t(16) = 4.473, p < .001, d = 2.21. The same contrast in the liberal subgroup was
medium-large but not statistically significant, t(22) = 1.703, p = .103, d = 0.74.1 It is
unclear whether the difference between these two contrasts is significant. These findings have
informed subsequent theoretical and empirical work in the psychology of morality and
1 The original authors reported only the t value and degrees of freedom. We used that information in R to
calculate the p value using the userfriendlyscience::convert.t.to.p function and the effect size using the
BSDA::tes function. Based on the reported df, there were N = 24 liberal participants in this analysis; the
authors did not report how many of them were in the disgust and nondisgust groups. We, thus, assumed that
1/3 of them (n = 8) were randomized to the disgust group, and 2/3 (n = 16) to the nondigust group (control
or sweet) when calculating the effect size.
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politics (e.g., Chapman, 2018; Chapman & Anderson, 2012; Haidt, 2012; Vicario et al.,
2017), yet no attempts have been made to more precisely estimate the size of the effect.
Given the wide reaching impact of this study, it is important to replicate it to gauge the
generalizability and reliability of the effect.
Current Study
This study is a multi-lab effort to replicate the methods used by Eskine et al. (2011).
We test (1) whether a bitter beverage indeed prompts harsher moral judgments than both a
sweet beverage and water, and (2) whether these effects are stronger in politically
conservative populations than in politically liberal ones. This study’s overarching goal is to
provide high-powered estimates of the effect observed by Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz (2011)
using a crowdsourcing approach (see Hagger et al., 2016; Moshontz et al., 2018). That is,
instead of evaluating the “replication success” of the original study based solely on the
results of a single replication, we meta-analyze many distinct replication attempts using
frequentist and Bayesian statistical approaches.
In sum, our goal in this report is to estimate both the main effect of beverage type on
moral judgments and to test political orientation as a moderator. We examined two
contrasts for the effect of beverage type: bitter versus control and bitter versus sweet. With
respect to moderation by political orientation, we focused primarily on the comparison
between conservative and liberal participants.
Disclosures
Preregistration. Before data collection, each lab preregistered their materials,
protocol, and analysis plans on the Open Science Framework (OSF). In addition, we
registered our analysis plan for this manuscript on the OSF prior to conducting the analyses
reported herein; see our project at https://osf.io/5ygsp. Our preregistration represents a
partial preregistration in that each author knew the results of at least one particular
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replication before we preregistered the meta-analysis plan.
Data, materials, and online resources. After labs completed their study, they
uploaded raw data, analyses (including syntax), and a clear explanation of results to their
own page at the OSF. The data and all other relevant documentation of each of the labs
included in this meta-analysis can be found at https://osf.io/4hkjv/forks/. We uploaded the
data and analysis code for this manuscript to our project page at https://osf.io/5ygsp.
Reporting. This manuscript is based on analysis of existing data rather than new
data collection. We report how we determined the sample size for this manuscript, and all
data exclusions, manipulations, and measures.
Ethical approval. Each individual site secured approval from an institutional
review board or similar committee prior to data collection, and carried out the study in
accordance with the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.
Method
The replication studies reported herein were conducted as part of the Collaborative
Replications and Education Project (CREP; see our in-detail text box describing CREP in
the appendix). All participants provided informed consent prior to participating. Eleven
replication studies took place at five universities in the United States and three universities
in Europe (United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands). Table A1 in the appendix lists
labs by study number, site, and mentor.
Design
The design was a 3 × 3 between-subjects factorial design. The first factor was the
experimental manipulation, a drink intended to produce either a neutral (control), sweet, or
bitter taste sensation. The drink conditions were water, fruit punch, and Swedish Bitters (an
herbal digestive aid). The second factor was political orientation. The political orientation
DISGUST AND MORAL WRONGNESS JUDGMENTS 9
conditions were conservative, liberal and other.2
Target Sample Size
The minimum target for the overall sample for meta-analysis was 2.5 times the original
sample of 57, or 143 participants, which would be sufficient for a “small telescopes” analysis
(Simonsohn, 2015). Individual labs were permitted to continue to submit qualified
replication samples until December 2017. The CREP recommended each lab collect data
from at least 57 participants (matching the original sample), but not all labs hit this target.
We included labs who did not hit the target N in our analysis because we were primarily
concerned with having adequate power to accurately estimate the overall effect size in the
weighted meta-analysis across all samples (and we were not concerned about the power of an
individual sample).
Deviations from Original Study
The CREP team contacted the original authors, who provided the original moral
dilemma vignettes, manipulation check, and informed consent forms. We could not obtain
the original “imageability distractor task” or “cover story” so we created our own based on
the description in the paper. Our distractor task is available here: https://osf.io/ju7nq/.
Our cover story consisted of the following paragraph:
“In this study you will be asked to read several vignettes and make judgments about
the characters in them. Your job will be to judge the actions of the characters. During this
task, you will be asked to drink a beverage. The purpose of this study is to determine
whether motor movements involved with drinking influence your judgments while reading
about others. In order to successfully attain this, please drink each dose in a single swift
2 The original authors also assessed these three political orientations, but exclusively focused on conservative
and liberal categories when computing their ANOVA and their follow-up contrast analyses. Their design was,
thus, effectively 3 × 2 between-subjects factorial.
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motion, as if you were drinking a shot.”
Two problems arose with using an international sample to replicate: First, the terms
“liberal” and “conservative” as used in the United States do not necessarily translate to
major political axes within other countries. The European labs adapted this question to
capture similar concepts in their respective countries. The two authors responsible for coding
political orientation in the pooled sample communicated with faculty supervisors of
non-American replications to better understand what participants meant in responding to
the political orientation question. For example, in a British sample, “right wing” and
“center-right” were coded as conservative, “center-left” and “left wing” were coded as liberal,
and responses such as “center” or “none” were coded as other.
Second, the drinks differ slightly from country to country. For example, Minute Maid
berry punch, the drink used in the original study, is not widely available outside of the US,
and Swedish Bitters can refer to something other than a bitter herb mix. In these cases we
suggested researchers substitute a sweet drink with similar sugar content and a bitter but
inert drink, respectively. We also gave individual labs discretion to substitute any brand of
Swedish Bitters given that the brand was not specified in the original paper. We used the
manipulation check to ensure that participants found the sweet drink sweet but not neutral
or disgusting and the bitter drink disgusting but not sweet or neutral.
A third deviation from the original study was that three of the studies (7, 9 and 10)
presented the moral vignettes via Qualtrics surveys rather than by paper and pencil.
Subjects in these three studies used a slider scale that yielded a number rather than making
a mark on a line on paper to indicate their moral judgments.
A fourth deviation from the original study was our decision to compute a moral
wrongness composite score for all participants who rated at least 3 out of 6 vignettes.3 We
3 Eskine et al. (2011) indicated that, “Three of the 57 participants correctly guessed our hypothesis and were
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preregistered this approach to maximize statistical power and minimize selection biases.
There were very few exclusions based on this preregistered criterion; three of the participants
tested rated fewer than 3 vignettes. See Preliminary Analyses of the moral wrongness
composite for further details.
Protocol Fidelity
Labs qualified to participate in this CREP project by submitting an application,
preparing an OSF page with all materials and procedures, and submitting a video of a mock
experimental procedure. Volunteer psychology professors working with CREP reviewed this
material for fidelity to the CREP protocol. The CREP protocol required the use of exact
stimuli such as the moral judgment task, use of approximate stimuli where necessary (for
example, Minute Maid Berry Punch is not easily available outside of the United States), and
appropriate data reporting. See this link for explicit CREP instructions and materials:
https://osf.io/4hkjv/. Labs were required to incorporate reviewer feedback on both written
procedures and the video to increase precise compliance. Each lab included at least one
student researcher and one supervising faculty sponsor. Labs that successfully complied with
CREP protocol, passed review, and submitted the target N (57) were eligible to receive a
CREP certificate and a monetary reward (monetary rewards ended in July 2017 as funding
ended).
therefore excluded from all analyses. An overall moral-judgment score was obtained for each of the remaining
54 participants (bitter condition: n = 15; sweet condition: n = 18; control condition: n = 21) by averaging
his or her ratings of the six vignettes” (p. 296). They did not indicate whether any participants had scores
for fewer than six of the vignettes, or if they set a minimum number of vignettes for which scores were
required to compute the moral wrongness composite. Without an explicit reference to the contrary, we
assume from this that all participants provided scores for all six vignettes and, thus, that our decision to
compute a moral wrongness composite score for participants who rated at least 3 out of 6 vignettes
represents a departure from the original research.
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Participants
We analyzed data from a total of 1,137 participants in k = 11 studies. The per-study
N ranged from 24 to 439 (median = 65). An additional four participants declined to confirm
consent to use of their data, three participants were under age 18 years, three participants
rated fewer than 3 vignettes, and beverage condition was unknown for an additional two
participants in one study.
In our preregistration, we indicated that if linear mixed-effects analyses indicate that
the effects of the beverage contrasts or their interactions with political orientation vary
across levels of participant knowledge of the hypothesis, we would exclude participants
demonstrating knowledge of the hypothesis. However, in part because we could not obtain
the open-ended responses necessary to code level of knowledge of the hypothesis for 3 out of
11 studies, we retained all available participants in our analyses. See Data analysis and
inference criteria.
With regard to gender, 671 (59%) identified as female, 392 (34%) as male, and 6 (1%)
as nonbinary; there was no gender information available for 68 (6%) participants.
Materials
Materials were provided on the OSF website including demographic information and
two versions of the moral vignette packet (identical but each in a different order).
As with the original study, labs used six vignettes first presented by Wheatley and
Haidt (2005). The six vignettes focus on the following main characters (and situations): Bob
(has a sexual relationship with his second cousin), Frank (cooks and eats his dead dog),
George (lawyer who seeks clients at the hospital emergency room), Arnold (politician who
condemns corruption but accepts bribes himself), Robert (shoplifts clothing), and Tim (takes
books and other items out of the library without checking them out).
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Moral judgments consisted of reading each vignette and answering the question “How
morally wrong is this?” by making a mark on a line or selecting a number on a scale with
not at all wrong, moderately wrong, and extremely wrong anchors. Ratings were scaled to a
range of 0-100 consistent with Eskine et al.
A distractor task about “imageability” was also created based on the description in the
original study (i.e., “. . . they described their language background and rated sentences for
their imageability.”) The intention of the distractor task is to accompany the cover story in
disguising the purpose of the study from participants.
Participants rated how much they enjoyed their beverage, and how sweet, bitter,
neutral, or disgusting they found their beverage using a 7-point scale ranging from 1, Not at
all, to 4, Neutral, to 7, Very much. This portion of the questionnaire served as a manipulation
check to ensure that each type of beverage elicited the intended response in the participants.
Labs were required to have access to drinking water, fruit punch, any brand of Swedish
Bitters, cups, a private space to fill out the experimental forms, a booklet or survey
containing the moral vignettes, the forms or survey used for a manipulation check,
demographics including political orientation, the distractor task, and the procedures
including the cover story. The specific questions used to collect demographic information
differed somewhat between labs. For example, some labs used an open answer box to collect
political orientation data, while others gave participants specific options to choose from.
The cover story was based on the description in the original paper: “They were told
that we were exploring the effects of motor interference (specifically arm-hand movements)
on cognitive processing, and we therefore directed them to drink a beverage during a
moral-judgment task to instantiate this movement in a natural way” (Eskine et al., 2011,
p. 296).
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Procedure
Prior to the arrival of participants, experimenters consulted a pre-printed list of
random numbers or the online survey used for random assignment to determine the
appropriate drink preparation for the respective participant. Participants were run
individually in physically separate spaces.
After providing informed consent, experimenters explained the study was an
examination of the influence of motor interference on cognitive processing. On the informed
consent form, experimenters provided a list of ingredients for the appropriate beverage
condition to avoid exposing participants to allergens unwittingly. Researchers called
attention to the ingredient list in case participants had not read the consent form closely.
(Participants at the Tufts site verbally confirmed they were not allergic to any of the
ingredients during the consent process.) Experimenters provided the beverage and told
participants to drink it in a swift motion “as if drinking a shot.” Participants then completed
the first half of the moral judgment task. Experimenters administered a second serving of
the beverage and then instructed participants to complete the second half of the moral
judgment task.
Participants then completed the distractor task, beverage ratings, and demographic
information including political orientation. Finally, they responded to the prompt “What do
you think this study is about? Please provide a few details to explain your answer.” Upon
completion, participants were debriefed verbally and in writing. The complete protocol,
including a script for researchers, is available on the OSF page for this study.
Two authors (EG and MAF) who were blind to beverage assignment coded political
orientation responses into one of three categories, conservative, liberal, or other. The “other”
category included participants who declined to provide information. The two coders
exhibited excellent agreement, Cohen’s kappa = 1.00, 95% CI[0.99, 1] (weighted kappa =
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0.99). We used the first coder’s responses in subsequent analyses. Across studies, 648 (57%)
were coded as liberal, 162 (14%) as conservative, and 327 (29%) as other.
The same two authors coded the open-ended responses in which participants explained
what they thought the study was about into one of three categories capturing levels of
knowledge about the hypothesis. The three categories were naive (i.e., no insight into the
hypothesis; e.g., “How the mechanical act of drinking would affect an individual’s moral
judgment.”), partially suspicious (i.e., insight into part of the hypothesis; e.g., “This study
may be about how much we liked or disliked the beverage and whether or not that
influenced our answers.”), and fully suspicious (i.e., clear and accurate guess of hypothesis;
e.g., “This study is about how arm movement/taste can determine how you feel/think about
something. I had a bad taste in my mouth so I saw everyone as bad in the short stories.”).
The two coders exhibited very good agreement, Cohen’s kappa = 0.76, 95% CI[0.71, 0.80]
(weighted kappa = 0.83). When the two coders disagreed, we selected the value representing
greater knowledge of the hypothesis. We could not obtain participant responses to this
question for Studies 1, 2, and 3 and thus could not code level of knowledge of the hypothesis
for any of the participants in these three studies.
Note that because the knowledge/suspicion question was presented after the beverage
rating manipulation check, it is possible that thinking about the beverages during the ratings
task triggered participants’ subsequent guesses about the purpose of the study. As a result,
some participants we classified as partially or fully suspicious may have actually been naïve
when they made wrongness judgments but were “clued in” to the hypothesis by the time
they were asked to guess the purpose of the study. Thus the partially and fully suspicious
groups may include subjects who had been naïve when making judgments; we can however,
be fairly certain that subjects who responded with naiveté even with the benefit of exposure
to the beverage rating hints, were in fact naïve when they made their judgments.
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Data analysis and inference criteria
We present the rationale for and details of all analyses where applicable in the Results
section. Broadly speaking, in preliminary analyses, we computed descriptive statistics for
moral wrongness and beverage ratings, and internal consistency reliability for the moral
wrongness composite. In confirmatory analyses, we conducted random effects meta-analyses
for two effects of interest, bitter versus control and bitter versus sweet. We also conducted
one-sided tests to determine whether observed effects were smaller than the effect size the
original study could have detected with 33% power and/or equivalent to zero. To
complement these approaches, we conducted linear mixed-effects regression (LMER)
modeling of individual participant judgments of moral wrongness. Finally, we conducted a
series of four Bayes Factors (BF) tests described by Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) for
each replication study.
For analyses based on null hypothesis significance testing, we set an alpha criterion of
.05 (two-tailed). For BF tests, we considered BF greater than 3 to provide nonanecdotal
evidence for the replication hypothesis and BF less than 1/3 to be nonanecdotal evidence
against the replication hypothesis.
We wrote this manuscript as an R Markdown document in RStudio 1.2.1335 (RStudio
Team, 2015), and analyzed our data using R (Version 3.5.2; R Core Team, 2017) and the
R-packages BayesFactor (Version 0.9.12.4.2; Morey & Rouder, 2015), bindrcpp (Version
0.2.2; Müller, 2018), boot (Version 1.3.20; Davison & Hinkley, 1997), BSDA (Version 1.2.0;
Arnholt & Evans, 2017), coda (Version 0.19.2; Plummer, Best, Cowles, & Vines, 2006),
compute.es (Version 0.2.4; Re, 2013), dplyr (Version 0.8.0.1; Wickham et al., 2017), effsize
(Version 0.7.4; Torchiano, 2017), emmeans (Version 1.3.4; Lenth, 2018), ggplot2 (Version
3.1.1; Wickham, 2009), gridExtra (Version 2.3; Auguie, 2017), lattice (Version 0.20.38;
Sarkar, 2008), lme4 (Version 1.1.21; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), lmerTest
(Version 3.1.0; Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017), MASS (Version 7.3.51.1;
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Venables & Ripley, 2002), Matrix (Version 1.2.15; Bates & Maechler, 2017), MBESS
(Version 4.4.3; Kelley, 2017), MCMCpack (Version 1.4.4; Martin, Quinn, & Park, 2011),
metafor (Version 2.0.0; Viechtbauer, 2010), pacman (Version 0.5.0; Rinker & Kurkiewicz,
2017), papaja (Version 0.1.0.9842; Aust & Barth, 2017), polspline (Version 1.1.13;
Kooperberg, 2015), psych (Version 1.8.12; Revelle, 2017), pwr (Version 1.2.2; Champely,
2017), R2WinBUGS (Version 2.1.21; Sturtz, Ligges, & Gelman, 2005), SDMTools (Version
1.1.221; VanDerWal, Falconi, Januchowski, Shoo, & Storlie, 2014), sjlabelled (Version 1.0.16;
Lüdecke, 2018a), sjPlot (Version 2.6.2; Lüdecke, 2018b), sjstats (Version 0.17.3; Lüdecke,
2018c), stargazer (Version 5.2.2; Hlavac, 2018), stringr (Version 1.4.0; Wickham, 2019), tidyr
(Version 0.8.3; Wickham & Henry, 2017), TOSTER (Version 0.3.4; Lakens, 2017), viridis
(Version 0.5.1; Garnier, 2018a, 2018b), and viridisLite (Version 0.3.0; Garnier, 2018b).
When analyzing the data, we discovered that some studies contributed no or very few
observations to one or more cells of the study design. We made the post hoc decision to only
include studies for which there were at least n = 2 participants in each cell for random effect
meta-analyses, which allowed us to compute both a mean and standard deviation. This left k
= 5 studies for comparisons between the beverage conditions among only conservative
participants and k = 9 studies for comparisons among only liberal participants.4 We
included all available observations in our LMER models.
4 The original study had N = 19 conservative participants and N = 25 liberal participants. Assuming an
even distribution of participants to beverage conditions, they had a minimum of 6 participants per cell.
Results are similar if we instead require at least n = 6 in each cell to be consistent with the original study,
although doing so reduces the number of studies to k = 3 for comparisons among conservatives and k = 7 for
comparisons among liberals. See version 2 (dated January 14, 2019) of our preprint posted on PsyArXiv at
https://psyarxiv.com/349pk/.































Descriptives and internal consistency reliability for the moral wrongness composite in each replication study.
Number of Participants Mean (Standard Deviation) Internal Consistency
study bitter control sweet total bitter control sweet alpha [95% CI] omega [95% CI]
All participants
1 20 19 20 59 75.28 (10.92) 65.37 (17.06) 67.94 (15.64) 0.52 [0.3, 0.69] 0.64 [0, 0.74]
2 22 22 21 65 67.08 (11.12) 67.52 (12.49) 69.8 (8.59) 0.28 [0, 0.53] 0.37 [0, 0.59]
3 19 19 18 56 62.26 (17.09) 64.25 (14.59) 66.96 (13.82) 0.53 [0.27, 0.7] 0.46 [0.09, 0.61]
4 40 24 36 100 68.99 (11.93) 70.7 (15.7) 71.31 (12.32) 0.5 [0.3, 0.64] 0.38 [0.02, 0.48]
5 17 22 20 59 76.53 (13.97) 76.65 (11.06) 73.43 (10.74) 0.26 [0, 0.51] 0.44 [0.08, 1]
6 9 9 6 24 78.22 (11.96) 64.05 (20.92) 60.68 (22.09) 0.69 [0.31, 0.87] 0.7 [0.2, 0.85]
7 24 29 28 81 67.03 (14.27) 65.94 (12.96) 69.05 (15.24) 0.45 [0.19, 0.62] 0.4 [0.21, 0.53]
8 23 22 23 68 70.2 (11.27) 72.55 (12.63) 70.8 (15.9) 0.53 [0.33, 0.67] 0.55 [0.19, 0.71]
9 51 55 54 160 70.2 (12.36) 71.7 (14.36) 69.77 (12.49) 0.57 [0.44, 0.71] 0.58 [0.43, 0.7]
10 147 142 150 439 71.79 (14.65) 68.31 (13.78) 73.69 (14.24) 0.53 [0.45, 0.59] 0.54 [0.47, 0.6]
11 9 8 9 26 70.2 (17.26) 64.76 (8.88) 70.59 (19.38) 0.62 [0.28, 0.76] 0.58 [0.01, 0.71]
Conservatives
1 2 4 2 8 78.58 (2.57) 63.42 (8.64) 93.18 (9.64) 0.7 [0, 0.89] 0.58 [0.44, 0.64]
2 16 13 17 46 66.14 (11.48) 61.9 (10.31) 71.05 (7.9) 0.19 [0, 0.52] 0.37 [0, 1]



























5 3 7 2 12 78.1 (17.51) 75.73 (13.99) 82.8 (0.76) 0.48 [0, 0.72] NA [NA, NA]
10 17 16 20 53 76.67 (12.78) 70.25 (10.81) 72.23 (13.9) 0.4 [0.08, 0.63] 0.47 [0.19, 0.63]
Liberals
1 7 5 9 21 75.32 (12.2) 50.88 (10.46) 65.28 (13.94) 0.64 [0.26, 0.84] 0.75 [0, 0.85]
3 12 7 7 26 58.72 (14.3) 55.03 (13.64) 65.9 (16.01) 0.48 [0.03, 0.74] NA [NA, NA]
4 21 11 13 45 70.38 (13.59) 69.05 (16.07) 70.39 (15.49) 0.62 [0.42, 0.77] 0.67 [0.42, 1]
5 7 8 7 22 71.74 (12.14) 74.48 (12.41) 76.29 (5.57) NA [NA, NA] 0.11 [0, 1]
6 3 3 2 8 78.42 (17.77) 73.95 (15.98) 61.36 (1.4) 0.54 [0, 0.82] NA [NA, NA]
7 20 20 23 63 65.89 (15.08) 65.8 (12.92) 68.19 (14.72) 0.42 [0.12, 0.64] 0.41 [0.13, 0.57]
8 10 10 8 28 65.53 (6.15) 78.8 (13.42) 70.04 (10.58) 0.4 [0, 0.68] NA [NA, NA]
9 30 31 29 90 69.91 (12.82) 72.33 (12.72) 67.25 (12.3) 0.57 [0.4, 0.7] 0.59 [0.37, 0.74]
10 108 111 113 332 70.43 (14.99) 68.3 (13.74) 73.72 (14.55) 0.54 [0.46, 0.61] 0.55 [0.45, 0.62]
Note. Internal consistency was calculated across beverage groups. 95% confidence intervals (CI) were determined via 2,000
bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap replications. Results were reported as NA for alpha when negative correlations
between some items and the total score led to a negative value (conservatives in Study 4 and liberals in Study 5). Results were
reported as NA for omega when the model failed to converge (conservatives in Study 5 and liberals in Study 3, 6, and 8).
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We computed a moral wrongness composite for participants who provided moral
wrongness judgments for at least 3 of 6 vignettes. All participants did so for at least 4
vignettes; 99.12% had a value for 5 or 6 vignettes (7.04% had a value for 5 vignettes, 92.08%
had a value for 6 vignettes).
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the moral wrongness composite in each
beverage group for each replication study. We will provide descriptive statistics across
studies in the Confirmatory Analyses section of the Results.5
Table 1 also shows internal consistency reliability of the moral wrongness composite
across beverage groups in each replication study. Cronbach’s alpha calculated across all
political orientations within each study ranged from 0.26 to 0.69 (median = 0.53), and omega
ranged from 0.37 to 0.70 (median = 0.54). Internal consistency by study therefore ranged
from poor to acceptable, with most falling below .70. Across participants in all studies,
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.50, 95% CI[0.45, 0.54], and omega was 0.49, 95% CI[0.43, 0.54].
Beverage Ratings. As a manipulation check, we assessed the extent to which the
three beverages had the intended effect on subjective ratings (bitter, disgusting, neutral, and
sweet) for each study. We computed descriptive statistics and linear regression models that
compared ratings for the bitter group to ratings made by each of the other two groups across
all participants and for conservative and liberal subgroups for each study (see Table A3 in
the appendix). In addition, to summarize across studies, we examined four LMER models
assessing the fixed effects of beverage type and political orientation on each rating with a
random intercept for studies (see Table A4 in the appendix). The beverage contrasts were
consistently significant in expected directions for all three political orientations.
Based on estimated marginal means from the LMER models, the bitter group
5 See Table A2 in the appendix for linear regression models that compared moral wrongness judgments for
the bitter group to ratings made by each of the other two groups across all participants and for conservative
and liberal subgroups for each study.
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perceived their beverage to be quite bitter, M = 6.18, 95% CI [5.98, 6.38], and disgusting,
M = 5.84, 95% CI [5.63, 6.05], and not very sweet, M = 1.44, 95% CI [1.27, 1.61], or neutral,
M = 1.48, 95% CI [1.27, 1.68] (7-point scale). The control group perceived their beverage to
be quite neutral, M = 5.65, 95% CI [5.45, 5.85], and not very bitter, M = 1.67, 95% CI
[1.48, 1.87], disgusting, M = 1.36, 95% CI [1.15, 1.57], or sweet, M = 1.74, 95% CI [1.57,
1.91]. The sweet group perceived their beverage to be quite sweet, M = 5.55, 95% CI [5.39,
5.71], and not very bitter, M = 1.98, 95% CI [1.79, 2.17], disgusting, M = 1.95, 95% CI
[1.74, 2.15], or neutral, M = 2.28, 95% CI [2.08, 2.47].
Level of Knowledge of the Hypothesis. Of the 933 participants for whom we
were able to code knowledge of the hypothesis, N = 543 (58.20%) were naive, N = 336
(36.01%) were partially suspicious, and N = 54 (5.79%) were fully suspicious. The original
authors did not report how many participants were partially suspicious, but indicated that 3
out of 57 (5%) “correctly guessed our hypothesis” (Eskine et al., 2011, p. 296).
Based on predicted probabilities obtained in a generalized linear mixed-effects logistic
regression assessing the fixed effects of beverage type and political orientation with a random
intercept for studies on level of knowledge (0 = naive, 1 = partially or fully suspicious), more
participants in the bitter (60.65%) and sweet (52.37%) groups were partially or fully
suspicious relative to the participants in the control group (38.85%). The difference was
statistically significant for bitter versus control, blogodds = 0.65, SE = 0.26, p = .014, but not
for sweet versus control, blogodds = 0.37, SE = 0.26, p = .145 (see Figure A1 in the appendix).
Confirmatory Analyses
Random Effects Meta-analyses and One-sided Tests. In our first set of
analyses, we estimated the standardized effects of the two beverage contrasts on moral
wrongness within and across political orientations and within and across replication studies
by conducting random-effect meta-analyses. These meta-analyses enable us to estimate to
what extent drinking a disgusting, bitter beverage harshens moral judgments in standardized
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units relative to both water (control) and juice (sweet). We would conclude there is support
for the hypotheses if the two overall effects (bitter versus control and bitter versus sweet)
were significantly greater than zero in the positive direction, perhaps only among
conservative participants as in the original study. We used a random effects approach to
determine to what extent effect sizes vary from one study to the next. We excluded the
original study from these analyses as is typical for registered replication reports (e.g.,
Wagenmakers et al., 2016); this yields estimates that are based only on unpublished studies
that were registered in advance and, thus, are unbiased.
In addition to random effects meta-analyses, we conducted one-sided tests examining
whether the standardized meta-analytic effect sizes for the two contrasts of interest were
significantly smaller than the effect size the original authors had 33% power to detect (d33%;
small-telescopes approach; Simonsohn (2015)). The small-telescopes approach tells us
whether the replication study effect size is large enough to have been detectable in the
original study. If the replication study were well-powered and the replication effect
significantly smaller than d33%, we would conclude that the original study was unable to
draw meaningful conclusions about the studied effect. Across all participants in the original
study, d33% = 0.53 for the bitter versus control contrast, and d33% = 0.55 for the bitter
versus sweet contrast. Among conservative participants, d33% = 0.94 for both contrasts.
Among liberal participants, d33% = 0.80 for both contrasts.6
Finally, we also conducted one-sided tests examining whether the replication effect was
effectively equivalent to zero. We preregistered two sets of standardized effect size
6 The original report did not specify the number of participants in each beverage group for conservative (N
= 19) and liberal (N = 25) subgroups. We therefore assumed an even distribution and estimated 19/3 = 6.33
conservative participants in each beverage group and 25/3 = 8.33 liberal participants in each beverage group
when calculating d33%. For results of one-sided tests of the moral wrongness composite in each replication
study asking whether the observed effect size was smaller than d33% or equivalent to 0 +/- d33%, see Tables
A5 and A6 in the appendix, respectively.
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equivalence bounds around 0, specifically 0 +/- d33% and 0 +/- 0.30 (Lakens, Scheel, &
Isager, 2018). The equivalence bound of +/- d33% reflects the smallest effect size the original
study could have detected. The equivalence bound of +/- 0.30 reflects the smallest effect size
of interest to us in light of possible inadequate power to detect equivalence to zero of effects
smaller than that. To simplify presentation of results, we deviate from our preregistration
and only report results for the more stringent of the two, 0 +/- 0.30. If the meta-analytic
effect sizes were equivalent to 0 +/- 0.30, this would suggest that the effects are unlikely to
be larger than +/- 0.30.
Figures 1 and 2 display the standardized effect sizes and 95% confidence interval for
each contrast within and across studies across all participants and for conservative and
liberal subgroups. Figures A2 and A3 in the appendix display the parallel information for
raw mean differences instead of standardized mean differences; the pattern is quite similar.
In the text below we summarize results for the two contrasts of interest, bitter versus control
and bitter versus sweet across all participants as well as separately within conservative and
liberal subgroups.
All Participants.
Across all participants in k = 11 studies, mean moral wrongness across studies,
weighted by number of participants in each group for each study, was 70.65 (SD = 3.52) in
the bitter group, 68.94 (SD = 3.41) in the control group, and 71.29 (SD = 2.86) in the sweet
group.
The overall effect for bitter versus control was negligible and in the predicted direction.
This effect was significantly smaller than d33% = 0.53, Z = -5.22, p = < .001. It was also
equivalent to 0 +/- 0.30, Z = -2.42, p = .008. Heterogeneity was low.
The overall effect for bitter versus sweet was negligible but in the opposite of the
predicted direction. This effect was significantly smaller than d33% = 0.55, Z = -8.31, p <
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.001. It was also equivalent to 0 +/- 0.30, Z = 3.51, p < .001. Heterogeneity was low.
Conservative Participants.
Across conservative participants in k = 5 studies, mean moral wrongness across studies,
weighted by number of participants in each group for each study, was 70.98 (SD = 6.99) in
the bitter group, 68.45 (SD = 5.88) in the control group, and 73.53 (SD = 5.64) in the sweet
group.
The overall effect for bitter versus control was small and in the predicted direction.
This effect was significantly smaller than d33% = 0.94, Z = -1.80, p = .036. It was not
equivalent to 0 +/- 0.30, Z = -0.22, p = .412. Heterogeneity was substantial.
The overall effect for bitter versus sweet was medium and in the opposite of the
predicted direction. This effect was significantly smaller than d33% = 0.94, Z = -4.46, p <
.001. However, it was not equivalent to 0 +/- 0.30, Z = -0.52, p = .697. Heterogeneity was
moderate.
Liberal Participants.
Across liberal participants in k = 9 studies, mean moral wrongness across studies,
weighted by number of participants in each group for each study, was 69.38 (SD = 3.97) in
the bitter group, 68.66 (SD = 5.94) in the control group, and 71.23 (SD = 4.01) in the sweet
group.
The overall effect for bitter versus control was near zero. This effect was significantly
smaller than d33% = 0.80, Z = -4.95, p < .001, and equivalent to 0 +/- 0.30, Z = -1.78, p =
.038. Heterogeneity was moderate.
The overall effect for bitter versus sweet was negligible and in the opposite of the
predicted direction. This effect was significantly smaller than d33% = 0.80, Z = -8.97, p <
.001. It was also equivalent to 0 +/- 0.30, Z = 1.91, p = .028. Heterogeneity was low.
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Linear Mixed-Effects Regression Models. The random effects meta-analyses
and one-sided tests above enabled us to examine the standardized effect of the beverage
manipulation on moral wrongness within and across political orientation groups. These
analyses also addressed the extent to which beverage effects vary across replication studies.
They did not, however, reveal whether political orientation and/or knowledge of the
hypothesis formally moderate the effects of beverage condition on moral wrongness. They
also did not account for potential random variation in moral wrongness across participants
and vignettes. Thus, we conducted linear mixed-effects regressions (LMER) of the individual
participant replication data to address these gaps. Apportioning all relevant sources of
variation simultaneously in LMER may increase sensitivity to detect predicted effects. For
the same reasons expressed for the random effects meta-analyses, we excluded the original
study from these analyses.
LMER Model Specification.
We report three LMER models.7 All models included fixed effects reflecting beverage
type with two contrasts, bitter [.5] versus control [-.5] (bvc; sweet [0]) and bitter [.5] versus
sweet [-.5] (bvs; control [0]), and political orientation also with two contrasts, conservative
[.5] versus liberal [-.5] (cvl; other [0]), and conservative [.5] versus other [-.5] (cvo), and their
interactions.
In Model 1, we analyzed moral wrongness as a composite averaged across vignettes
with a random intercept to allow variation in average moral wrongness across studies.
Because we used effect coding, the intercept reflects mean moral wrongness across all
participants. There were N = 1137 observations (participants) for this analysis.
7 We originally planned to report models that included random slopes for beverage type and political
orientation contrasts across studies, levels of knowledge of the hypothesis, and/or vignettes. However, with
only three levels of knowledge, the plan to examine random variation as a function of this variable was
ill-advised. Also, we excluded models with random slopes (convergence issues), and treated level of
knowledge of the hypothesis as an additional fixed effect.
DISGUST AND MORAL WRONGNESS JUDGMENTS 27
In Model 2, we added level of knowledge of the hypothesis as a fixed effect that could
interact with both beverage type and political orientation.8 We recoded the knowledge
variable to 0, naive, or 1, partially or fully suspicious9; the intercept therefore reflects mean
moral wrongness among naive participants. We could not retrieve the open-ended responses
to the question about what the study was about for three studies. As such, we could not
code level of knowledge of the hypothesis for any of the participants in those studies. With
these study-level exclusions, there were N = 933 observations (participants) for this analysis.
In Model 3, we analyzed moral wrongness for each vignette with the fixed effects from
Model 2 and with random intercepts that allowed variation in mean moral wrongness across
studies, participants, and vignettes. The intercept reflects mean moral wrongness among
naive participants. There were N = 5502 observations reflecting 933 participants each with
moral wrongness ratings for up to 6 vignettes. A total of 96 moral wrongness ratings were
missing (1.71%) across 3 studies. We did not impute missing values.
LMER Model Results.
Confirmatory.
Table 2 summarizes results of the three LMER models. See the appendix for figures
depicting moral wrongness in all design cells after accounting for fixed and random sources of
variation in Model 1 or 2.
Consistent with the hypothesis that physical disgust induces moral wrongness,
participants who drank a bitter beverage made significantly harsher moral judgments than
those who drank water (see BvC term in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively). However,
contrary to the hypothesis, participants who drank a bitter beverage made numerically
8 As shown earlier in this manuscript, level of knowledge of the hypothesis varied as a function of beverage
type, thus these two predictors are not orthogonal.
9 There were no conservative participants who were coded as suspicious, thus we could not retain all three
levels of knowledge of the hypothesis.
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milder moral judgments than those who drank the sweet juice; this difference was not
statistically significant (see BvS term in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively).
The bitter minus control effect did not vary significantly by conservative or liberal
political orientation (see BvC × CvL and BvC × CvL × Knowledge terms in Models 1, 2,
and 3, respectively). Similarly, the bitter minus sweet effect did not vary significantly by
conservative or liberal political orientation (see BvS × CvL and BvS × CvL × Knowledge
terms in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively). See bottom panel of Figure A4.
The bitter minus control effect did, however, vary significantly by level of knowledge of
the hypothesis (see BvC × Knowledge terms in Models 2 and 3). Based on estimated
marginal means from Model 2, among naive participants, the bitter beverage, M = 72.42
(SE = 1.56), resulted in harsher moral judgments than water, M = 67.90 (SE = 1.35); this
simple effect was statistically significant, t(45.35) = 2.46, p = .018. Among suspicious
participants, the bitter beverage, M = 70.43 (SE = 1.70), resulted in milder moral
judgments than water, M = 74.02 (SE = 2.03); this simple effect was not statistically
significant, t(87.03) = -1.41, p = .161.
The bitter minus sweet effect did not vary significantly by level of knowledge of the
hypothesis (see BvS × Knowledge terms in Models 2 and 3). Based on estimated marginal
means from Model 2, among naive participants, the bitter beverage, M = 72.42 (SE = 1.56),
resulted in similar moral judgments compared to the sweet juice, M = 72.15 (SE = 1.48).
Among suspicious participants, the bitter beverage, M = 70.43 (SE = 1.70), also resulted in
similar moral judgments compared to the sweet juice, M = 71.31 (SE = 1.60).
The proportion of variance in moral wrongness due to studies was 0.03 and 0.01,
respectively, based on intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) computed based on Models 1
and 2. The proportion of variance across studies was lower in Model 3, ICC = 0.00, likely




























Linear mixed-effects models examining moral wrongness
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) 69.937∗∗∗ (0.874) 70.826∗∗∗ (0.956) 70.782∗∗∗ (2.706)
bitter - control (BvC) 3.276∗ (1.369) 5.849∗∗ (2.045) 5.794∗∗ (2.045)
bitter - sweet (BvS) −2.030 (1.339) −2.657 (2.135) −2.526 (2.136)
conservative - liberal (CvL) 2.388 (1.233) 1.042 (1.760) 1.118 (1.762)
conservative - other (CvO) −1.864 (1.373) 1.467 (2.141) 1.370 (2.141)
Level of Knowledge (0 = naive) 1.093 (1.255) 1.083 (1.257)
BvC × CvL 2.823 (3.271) 5.905 (4.720) 6.061 (4.721)
BvC × CvO −0.702 (3.717) −5.826 (5.601) −5.636 (5.598)
BvS × CvL 1.484 (3.218) 5.981 (4.906) 6.199 (4.909)
BvS × CvO −6.109 (3.666) −7.857 (5.997) −7.784 (5.990)
BvC × Knowledge −10.050∗∗ (3.622) −9.883∗∗ (3.631)
BvS × Knowledge 3.878 (3.377) 3.754 (3.378)
CvL × Knowledge 3.534 (2.837) 3.663 (2.840)
CvO × Knowledge −3.718 (3.235) −3.625 (3.235)
BvC × CvL × Knowledge −10.074 (8.267) −10.139 (8.284)
BvC × CvO × Knowledge −0.757 (9.421) −0.794 (9.429)
BvS × CvL × Knowledge −8.651 (7.796) −8.802 (7.797)
BvS × CvO × Knowledge 9.230 (8.904) 9.114 (8.898)
Observations 1,137 933 5,502
Log Likelihood −4,590.005 −3,735.196 −25,537.830
Akaike Inf. Crit. 9,202.011 7,510.392 51,119.670
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 9,257.409 7,607.160 51,265.150
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Exploratory.
Confirmatory LMER analyses as a whole did not reveal support for the hypothesis that
drinking a bitter, disgusting beverage would promote a heightened sense of moral wrongness
relative to drinking both water or sweet juice, either in all participants or among
conservative participants. As such, we conducted some exploratory LMER analyses.
1. LMER Results for Participants Rating All Six Vignettes
We included all participants in our analyses who provided ratings of at least three of
the six vignettes. It is possible that hypothesized effects might emerge only among
participants who rated all six. Table A7 in the appendix presents the three original LMER
models again, this time after excluding participants who rated fewer than six vignettes.
Estimates in these models are all rather similar in magnitude and direction to the models
that included participants who rated only three or more vignettes; none of them reveal
hypothesized elevations of moral wrongness for the bitter group relative to both the control
and sweet groups across everyone or as a function of political orientation.
2. LMER Results by Vignette
It is possible that hypothesized effects might emerge in a subset of vignettes. For
example, researchers have argued in the past that moral judgments of purity violations might
be particularly susceptible to manipulations of physical disgust (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, &
Cohen, 2009). Table A8 in the appendix presents six linear mixed-effects models which are
structured the same as Model 1 but with moral wrongness for an individual vignette as the
criterion variable in each. Table A9 presents two linear mixed-effects models which are
structured the same as Models 1 and 2 but with moral wrongness across the two purity
violation vignettes as the criterion variable. None of these models reveal elevations of moral
wrongness for the bitter group relative to both the control and sweet groups across everyone
or as a function of political orientation. These results fail to support a causal effect of
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physical disgust on moral wrongness judgments.
3. Association between Moral Wrongness and Disgust Ratings
Eskine et al. (2011) reported a positive between-subjects association between disgust
ratings and moral wrongness judgments across participants, β = .53, t(52) = 4.45, p < .001.
In the present replication studies, zero-order correlations between these two variables by
study ranged from r = -0.11 to 0.42. A bivariate LMER assessing the fixed effect of disgust
ratings (standardized) on moral wrongness (standardized) revealed a positive association, β
= 0.07, p = .014. In two additional LMERs, bitter ratings were not associated with moral
wrongness, β = 0.01, p = .808, and bitter and disgust ratings were strongly positively
associated with one another, β = 0.77, p = < .001. An LMER assessing the fixed effects of
all four beverage ratings yielded a positive association between disgust and moral wrongness
controlling for the other ratings, β = 0.15, p = .003. Across studies, each one-unit increase
in disgust specifically (7-point scale) was associated with a b = 0.87-unit increase in moral
wrongness (101-point scale). By contrast, there was a negative association between
bitterness and moral wrongness controlling for the other ratings, β = -0.12, p = .019, and
near-zero associations between neutral, β = -0.04, p = .363, and sweet, β = 0.02, p = .675,
ratings and moral wrongness. These results establish a small, correlational link between
physical disgust and moral wrongness judgments that likely does not reflect general
unpleasantness since controlling for bitterness does not mitigate the association.
Bayes Factor Tests. Finally, the random effects meta-analyses and the LMER
analyses above all rely on a frequentist statistical perspective with presentation of
standardized effect sizes, confidence intervals, and p values. In our last set of analyses, we
conducted a set of Bayes Factor (BF) tests. Unlike frequentist methods, BF tests quantify
relative levels of evidence for the alternative hypotheses (i.e., that the bitter/disgusting
beverage would harshen moral judgments compared to the control and sweet beverages)
versus the null hypotheses (i.e., that there would be no effect of the beverage contrasts). Like
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Wagenmakers et al. (2016), these tests focus on each of the replication studies individually.
Three out of four of them explicitly incorporate the original study, as described below.
Bayes Factor Model Specification.
Following the logic and code given by Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014), below we
report four complementary BF tests for each replication study. In each case, the BF
represents a comparison between two models; it captures the extent of evidence for one
model relative to the other. First, the Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow (JZS) BF, which is independent
from the original finding, determines the relative evidence for the effect being present versus
absent in the replication by setting a standard two-sided Cauchy(0, 1) distribution as the
prior, ignoring the original study. Second, the replication BF test sets the prior based on the
posterior distribution from the original study. It determines the relative evidence for the
original effect versus a null effect. Third, the equality-of-effect-size BF test determines
whether the effect size in the replication study was equal to the effect size in the original
study by determining whether variance τ 2 of the effect sizes is zero relative to nonzero.
Fourth, the fixed-effect meta-analysis BF test pools the original and replication study data,
and uses the two-sided Cauchy(0,1) distribution as the prior (similar to the JZS BF test).10
Bayes Factor Results.
Figure 3 summarizes Bayes Factor results across all participants in all studies. (See
Table A10 and accompanying text in the appendix for Bayes Factor test results within
conservative and liberal subgroups.)
10 For the meta-analysis BF approach, we could have preregistered a meta-analysis BF across the original
and all replication studies. Instead, we preregistered this series of separate two-study meta-analyses (across
the original and each individual replication study) because doing so parallels what is possible with the other
three types of Bayes Factors. Moreover, it is consistent with the approach taken in the registered replication
report by Wagenmakers et al. (2016), who reported BFs for individual replication studies in addition to a
random effects meta-analysis across all replication studies, which we did as well.
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There was relatively consistent evidence against the replication hypothesis (bitter >
control and bitter > sweet) across most studies for the equality-of-effect-size, JZS, and
replication BF tests. By contrast, about half the studies provided evidence for the replication
hypothesis based on the fixed-effect meta-analysis BF (MetaBayes) test. That said, because
the MetaBayes BF tests pool the original and replication effects, the very large original effect
size likely has a strong influence on the outcome. Also noteworthy, of the four replication
studies for which MetaBayes provided more than nonanecdotal support for the replication
hypothesis for bitter versus control, only one had a large enough sample size to inspire
confidence in precision of estimation (Study 10 N = 439); the other three studies were on the
smaller side (Study 1 N = 59, Study 6 N = 24, and Study 11 N = 26, respectively).
Discussion
Several studies have shown that experimental manipulations of disgust can amplify
moral judgments (e.g., Harlé & Sanfey, 2010; Moretti & Pellegrino, 2010; Schnall et al.,
2008a, 2008b; Van Dillen, Wal, & Bos, 2012; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Although more
recent research has cast some doubt on the existence of this relationship, some studies have
proposed that the effect might be more robust for a specific type of manipulation: gustatory
and olfactory disgust inductions (see Landy & Goodwin, 2015a, also see 2015b; Schnall et al.,
2015). As this notion was largely based on one low-powered study with a particularly large
effect size, we were interested in obtaining an accurate estimate of its effect size by
conducting a high-powered meta-analysis of 11 preregistered direct replication studies.
Overall, we found little to no support for Eskine and colleagues’ (2011) conclusions.
We adopted a multifaceted analysis strategy in an effort to fairly examine the research
question (i.e., does gustatory disgust induced via a bitter drink amplify moral wrongness
judgments?) from slightly different angles. In part, we employed a frequentist approach,
running random effects meta-analyses, one-sided tests, and linear mixed-effects regression
models to make inferences across all replication studies. We observed a very small
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meta-analytic effect of the bitter drink inducing harsher moral judgments than water. This
effect was small and statistically significant in linear mixed-effects regressions. However, in
the random effects meta-analyses, effect size confidence intervals encompassed zero in all but
one replication, resulting in an overall confidence interval that included zero (see Figure 1).
In addition, standardized effects from those meta-analyses were significantly smaller than the
smallest effect the original authors could have found, and unlikely to be larger than +/- 0.30
based on equivalence tests. Moreover, across frequentist tests, we found no effect of the
bitter drink relative to the sweet one; if anything, the bitter drink led to more lenient moral
judgments than the sweet drink. This latter finding is important in that it undermines the
notion that disgust is responsible for any effects on moral judgments; instead, any effect on
moral judgments might be explained by the act of drinking something with flavor. Finally,
we found no evidence that political conservatives were especially harsh in their judgments
after consuming a bitter drink. It should be noted, though, that this latter finding is based
on a relatively small sample of conservative participants (a limitation discussed more
elaborately below).
We also used a Bayesian approach, which quantifies relative strength of the evidence in
favor of versus against the replication hypothesis. We computed four different Bayes Factor
(BF) tests, of which three (i.e., Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow, replication, and equality-of-effect-size
BF tests) showed evidence against the replication hypothesis across most studies. The
fixed-effect meta-analytic BF showed more support for the idea that disgust amplifies the
harshness of moral judgments. However, this is not surprising, as this approach pools each of
the replication studies with the original study, which had a particularly large effect. Even in
this case, though, only four of the eleven replication studies (three of which had smaller
sample sizes) favored support for the replication hypothesis.
Based on results from these various tests, we conclude there is little to no support for
the notion that gustatory disgust can increase ratings of moral wrongness. With that, our
DISGUST AND MORAL WRONGNESS JUDGMENTS 35
study adds to the growing number of studies that fail to find support for a relationship
between incidental manipulations of disgust and moral judgments (e.g., Johnson, Cheung, &
Donnellan, 2014; Case et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2016; Landy & Goodwin, 2015a). Our
results not only cast doubt on Eskine and colleagues’ (2011) conclusion that a disgusting
taste impacts moral judgments, they also fail to support Schnall and colleagues’ (2015)
proposal of a special potency for gustatory inductions of disgust to influence moral
condemnation.
It is possible that the effect of incidental disgust on moral judgments depends heavily
on moderator variables, such as individual difference measures. For example, it has been
suggested that the relationship is stronger for individuals who are generally sensitive to
bodily sensations (i.e., high on Private Body Consciousness, Schnall et al., 2008b, also see
2015). We did not measure Private Body Consciousness (PBC), or any other individual
difference measure, consistently across our studies so we cannot directly test this hypothesis.
However, an earlier replication study by Johnson and colleagues (2016) tested the
importance of PBC to the disgust-moral judgment link, but did not find evidence indicating
it has a moderating effect (also see Johnson et al., 2014).
One moderator variable that we identified is participant knowledge of the hypothesis.
A total of 6% of our participants demonstrated full knowledge of the hypothesis that drinking
a bitter beverage would harshen moral judgments; an additional 36% partially guessed that
hypothesis. We could not separate out effects by partial versus full suspicion due to absence
of observations in one cell of the factorial design. However, when combining the fully and
partially suspicious groups in our linear mixed-effects regression models, we found that the
bitter versus water effect was larger in the predicted direction among naive participants than
among fully or partially suspicious participants. This result is in line with the idea that
induced disgust has a stronger effect on individuals who are unaware of a link between the
taste of the drink and the moral judgments (Schnall et al., 2015). Contrary to this idea,
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however, knowledge of the hypothesis did not moderate the bitter versus sweet effect.
It is unclear how closely the coding scheme we used to assess knowledge of the
hypothesis maps onto the scheme used by the original authors. They reported that three of
57 participants (5%), who were excluded from analyses, correctly guessed the hypothesis.
Based on that percentage, which is close to the 6% who demonstrated full knowledge in the
present work, these participants may have had full knowledge, not just partial. Regardless,
we can conclude that knowledge of the beverage hypothesis moderates the effect of beverage
type on moral judgments to some extent. Future studies would benefit from refinement of
deception procedures to minimize such knowledge. On this point, it is noteworthy that more
participants in the bitter and sweet groups were partially or fully suspicious relative to the
participants in the water control group; deception procedures would ideally yield similar
rates of suspicion in all conditions so that level of knowledge of the hypothesis is orthogonal
to the beverage manipulation.
There are some limitations of the current investigation that may have impacted our
findings. One potential limitation is the low reliability of the moral vignettes across most of
our replication samples. This may have influenced our ability to detect effects, especially if
our average reliability was substantially lower than what was observed in the original study.
Unfortunately, information about reliability was not reported in Eskine et al. (2011), or in
Wheatley and Haidt (2005), the developers of these vignettes. However, linear mixed-effects
analyses of the individual vignettes reveal that the bitter drink does not induce harsher
moral judgments for any of the vignettes when compared to the sweet drink or water. It
therefore seems unlikely that the observed low reliability of moral vignettes explain our
mostly null findings.
Another limitation is that we had few samples with a sufficient number of conservative
participants when testing the moderating effect of political ideology. Only five out of 11
replications had at least two conservative participants in each of the three beverage
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conditions. Among those, only three had more than six conservative participants in each of
the three beverage conditions (i.e., the estimated number of conservatives per condition in
the original study). This likely decreased our ability to detect a potential moderation of
political ideology. It should be noted, though, that we had substantially more conservative
participants across replication samples (N = 162) than the original study (N = 19).
Conclusion
This work joins the growing number of crowdsourced replication projects combining
multiple laboratories’ efforts to replicate a single study (e.g., Moshontz et al., 2018; Hagger
et al., 2016; Schweinsberg et al., 2016). Multi-lab replications have an advantage over
single-lab replications in that they can more accurately estimate effect sizes given the
possibility of a much larger sample size. It also joins the growing movement of conducting
replications in the classroom (see also Leighton, Legate, LePine, Anderson, & Grahe, 2018;
Wagge et al., 2019). Replications conducted by students represent more than a valuable
pedagogical tool; they have been shown to be a promising means of carrying out high-quality
replications (Frank & Saxe, 2012; Hawkins et al., 2018). Here we demonstrate that
pedagogical replications can provide valuable evidence about the robustness of an effect that
has not yet been submitted to independent replication. We believe pedagogical replications
could be implemented widely to advance psychological science.
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Figure 1 . Effect sizes (standardized) for the original Eskine et al. (2011) study (Bitter versus
Control) and multiple replications across all participants, and for conservative and liberal
subgroups. Within each subgroup, we present studies in descending order by point estimate.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. RE Model refers to the overall estimate across
replication studies based on a random effects model; it excludes the original effect size. Purple
dashed vertical lines indicate +/- 0.30 equivalence bounds. The green dotted vertical line
indicates d33%.
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 0.32 [−0.31,  0.96]
−0.24 [−1.55,  1.07]
−0.49 [−1.17,  0.19]
−1.18 [−2.57,  0.21]
−1.21 [−2.21, −0.22]
 0.94 [−0.02,  1.90]
 0.85 [−0.55,  2.26]
 0.72 [−0.25,  1.68]
 0.21 [−0.30,  0.71]
−0.00 [−0.68,  0.67]
−0.15 [−0.74,  0.44]
−0.22 [−0.49,  0.04]
−0.45 [−1.45,  0.54]
−0.46 [−1.36,  0.44]










RE Model (Q(10) = 10.41, p = 0.405; I2 = 0.0%, T = 0.002)
RE Model (Q(4) = 8.78, p = 0.067; I2 = 54.6%, T = 0.504)
RE Model (Q(8) = 8.76, p = 0.363; I2 = 3.2%, T = 0.059)
Figure 2 . Effect sizes (standardized) for the original Eskine et al. (2011) study (Bitter versus
Sweet) and multiple replications across all participants, and for conservative and liberal
subgroups. Within each subgroup, we present studies in descending order by point estimate.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. RE Model refers to the overall estimate across
replication studies based on a random effects model; it excludes the original effect size. Purple
dashed vertical lines indicate +/- 0.30 equivalence bounds. The green dotted vertical line
indicates d33%.
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Figure 3 . Results of Bayes Factors tests across all participants in each replication study for
each contrast, bitter versus control (left) and bitter versus sweet (right). Each color represents
one of the four Bayes Factor tests. Horizontal lines mark BF = 3 and 0.33, thresholds above
and below which provide nonanecdotal evidence for and against the replication hypothesis,
respectively. JZSBayes = Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow (JZS) Bayes Factor; RepBayes = Replication
test Bayes Factor; EffectSizeBayes = equality-of-effect-size Bayes Factor; MetaBayes =
fixed-effect meta-analysis Bayes Factor. For JZSBayes, RepBayes, and MetaBayes, we report
BF10. For EffectSizeBayes, however, we report BF01 because replication success is supported
by evidence favoring zero variance, the null hypothesis. In all four cases, a larger value
constitutes greater relative support for the replication hypothesis.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the supplementary material referenced in the main
manuscript. At the end of this document, we provide the R session information at the
time we generated this document to support analytic reproducibility.
In-Detail Text Box: The Collaborative Replications and Education
Project
Each replication presented in this manuscript was conducted as a part of the
Collaborative Replications and Education Project (CREP; https://osf.io/wfc6u/), an
initiative to involve undergraduate methods and capstone students under faculty
supervision in the replication of psychological research. The CREP, like other
pedagogical replication projects (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2018), aims to train students on
best practices while contributing high-quality replication data to the field. There are
a number of quality checks built into the CREP to ensure high-fidelity replications,
such as a procedure and materials review by faculty experts before students are
approved to begin data collection.
The CREP process incorporates best replication/open practices recommended
by scholars (Brandt et al., 2014) and open science organizations (Center for Open
Science). Students joining the CREP first request a study from our list of available
studies to replicate (selected by the CREP team for impact, feasibility, and potential
student interest). On approval, students then build a study page on the OSF,
uploading their materials, IRB approval, and a video of their procedure to
demonstrate their fidelity to the original procedures. Next, the CREP team
(consisting of two to three PhD-level researchers trained on a particular study)
reviews the projects on that study.
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Following a successful review, students preregister their project and collect the
required sample size (usually equivalent to the original study’s sample size). Finally,
students post a summary of their results on their study page, along with their raw
data and codebook. At this point, the CREP team again reviews the project,
deciding whether to award a CREP certificate of completion based on attaining the
required minimum sample size and carrying out procedures as planned. Additionally,
students are encouraged to present their findings at conferences, and be involved with
manuscripts for the meta-analytic findings of CREP studies.
Study numbers, sites, and mentors
Table A1 lists labs by study number, site, and mentor.
Descriptive Statistics and Regressions Within Studies: Moral Wrongness
Judgments
Table A2 depicts descriptive statistics for the moral wrongness composite across
all participants and within the conservative and liberal subgroups in each study. This
table also depicts results of linear regression models comparing moral wrongness
judgments made by the bitter group to moral wrongness judgments made by each of
the other two groups.
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Table A1
Study number, site, and mentor for each replication
study.
Study Site and Mentor
1 Southern Oregon University, Christopherson
2 University of Erfurt, Weber
3 Illinois Institute of Technology, Guberman
4 University of Minnesota, Lenne
5 Indiana University Northwest, Fischer
6 Illinois Institute of Technology, Legate
7 Tufts University, Urry
8 Southern Oregon University, Christopherson
9 Tilburg University, Wagemans
10 Brunel University London, de Haan
11 Illinois Institute of Technology, Legate





























Mean (standard deviation) for the moral wrongness composite in each replication study along with results of multiple
regressions examining the effect of the bitter versus control and bitter versus sweet contrasts.
Descriptives Regression Results
study bitter control sweet Bitter versus Control predictor Bitter versus Sweet predictor
All participants
1 75.28 (10.92) 65.37 (17.06) 67.94 (15.64) t(56) = 1.52, p = .134 t(56) = 0.59, p = .559
2 67.08 (11.12) 67.52 (12.49) 69.80 (8.59) t(62) = 0.32, p = .747 t(62) = −0.87, p = .390
3 62.26 (17.09) 64.25 (14.59) 66.96 (13.82) t(53) = 0.08, p = .935 t(53) = −0.85, p = .399
4 68.99 (11.93) 70.70 (15.70) 71.31 (12.32) t(97) = −0.18, p = .857 t(97) = −0.53, p = .596
5 76.53 (13.97) 76.65 (11.06) 73.43 (10.74) t(56) = −0.52, p = .605 t(56) = 0.96, p = .340
6 78.22 (11.96) 64.05 (20.92) 60.68 (22.09) t(21) = 0.69, p = .496 t(21) = 1.21, p = .241
7 67.03 (14.27) 65.94 (12.96) 69.05 (15.24) t(78) = 0.64, p = .525 t(78) = −0.77, p = .441
8 70.20 (11.27) 72.55 (12.63) 70.80 (15.90) t(65) = −0.59, p = .558 t(65) = 0.17, p = .867
9 70.20 (12.36) 71.70 (14.36) 69.77 (12.49) t(157) = −0.79, p = .433 t(157) = 0.54, p = .590
10 71.79 (14.65) 68.31 (13.78) 73.69 (14.24) t(436) = 3.06, p = .002 t(436) = −2.54, p = .011
11 70.20 (17.26) 64.76 (8.88) 70.59 (19.38) t(23) = 0.82, p = .418 t(23) = −0.47, p = .644
Conservatives
1 78.58 (2.57) 63.42 (8.64) 93.18 (9.64) t(5) = 3.95, p = .011 t(5) = −3.33, p = .021



























4 63.97 (6.27) 72.74 (6.17) 74.65 (9.82) t(20) = −0.92, p = .370 t(20) = −1.87, p = .077
5 78.10 (17.51) 75.73 (13.99) 82.80 (0.76) t(9) = 0.56, p = .586 t(9) = −0.53, p = .609
10 76.67 (12.78) 70.25 (10.81) 72.23 (13.90) t(50) = 1.11, p = .274 t(50) = 0.34, p = .734
Liberals
1 75.32 (12.20) 50.88 (10.46) 65.28 (13.94) t(18) = 2.99, p = .008 t(18) = −0.39, p = .703
3 58.72 (14.30) 55.03 (13.64) 65.90 (16.01) t(23) = 1.12, p = .276 t(23) = −1.38, p = .180
4 70.38 (13.59) 69.05 (16.07) 70.39 (15.49) t(42) = 0.26, p = .797 t(42) = −0.14, p = .891
5 71.74 (12.14) 74.48 (12.41) 76.29 (5.57) t(19) = −0.10, p = .923 t(19) = −0.65, p = .521
6 78.42 (17.77) 73.95 (15.98) 61.36 (1.40) t(5) = −0.36, p = .730 t(5) = 1.20, p = .284
7 65.89 (15.08) 65.80 (12.92) 68.19 (14.72) t(60) = 0.32, p = .750 t(60) = −0.63, p = .533
8 65.53 (6.15) 78.80 (13.42) 70.04 (10.58) t(25) = −2.66, p = .013 t(25) = 0.49, p = .631
9 69.91 (12.82) 72.33 (12.72) 67.25 (12.30) t(87) = −1.34, p = .184 t(87) = 1.36, p = .178
10 70.43 (14.99) 68.30 (13.74) 73.72 (14.55) t(329) = 2.25, p = .025 t(329) = −2.60, p = .010
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Descriptive Statistics and Regressions Within Studies: Beverage Ratings
Table A3 depicts descriptive statistics for ratings of the extent to which the
beverages were perceived to be bitter, disgusting, neutral, and sweet across all
participants and within the conservative and liberal subgroups in each study. This
table also depicts results of linear regression models comparing ratings for the bitter




























Means (standard deviations) for beverage ratings in each replication study.
Descriptives Regression Results
study bitter control sweet Bitter versus Control predictor Bitter versus Sweet predictor
All participants: bitter
1 6.10 (1.45) 1.74 (1.52) 1.90 (1.25) t(56) = 5.76, p < .001 t(56) = 5.21, p < .001
2 6.32 (0.72) 1.27 (0.88) 1.48 (1.08) t(62) = 11.11, p < .001 t(62) = 9.70, p < .001
3 6.53 (0.61) 1.39 (0.83) 1.93 (1.46) t(53) = 9.85, p < .001 t(53) = 6.97, p < .001
4 6.20 (1.16) 2.17 (1.63) 2.06 (1.53) t(97) = 5.90, p < .001 t(97) = 7.11, p < .001
5 6.94 (0.24) 1.36 (1.18) 2.15 (1.69) t(56) = 9.61, p < .001 t(56) = 5.91, p < .001
6 6.78 (0.44) 2.00 (2.00) 1.17 (0.41) t(21) = 3.63, p = .002 t(21) = 5.34, p < .001
7 6.74 (0.45) 1.18 (0.77) 1.56 (1.15) t(75) = 14.64, p < .001 t(75) = 11.75, p < .001
8 6.13 (1.18) 1.59 (1.22) 1.74 (1.10) t(65) = 7.76, p < .001 t(65) = 7.10, p < .001
9 6.20 (1.04) 1.65 (1.34) 1.52 (1.09) t(157) = 11.33, p < .001 t(157) = 12.33, p < .001
10 6.10 (1.46) 1.77 (1.42) 2.61 (1.97) t(434) = 15.41, p < .001 t(434) = 8.01, p < .001
11 6.00 (1.22) 2.50 (2.14) 1.89 (1.05) t(23) = 2.24, p = .035 t(23) = 3.77, p = .001
All participants: disgust
1 6.10 (1.17) 1.21 (0.92) 2.45 (1.93) t(56) = 7.78, p < .001 t(56) = 3.10, p = .003
2 4.73 (1.64) 1.27 (0.77) 2.29 (1.23) t(62) = 6.74, p < .001 t(62) = 2.13, p = .037



























4 6.10 (1.24) 1.75 (1.39) 1.67 (1.04) t(97) = 7.53, p < .001 t(97) = 8.85, p < .001
5 6.76 (0.56) 1.00 (0.00) 1.80 (1.44) t(56) = 13.70, p < .001 t(56) = 8.49, p < .001
6 5.89 (1.05) 1.67 (1.41) 2.50 (2.07) t(21) = 4.00, p = .001 t(21) = 1.82, p = .082
7 5.70 (1.82) 1.07 (0.26) 1.70 (1.23) t(76) = 9.18, p < .001 t(76) = 5.76, p < .001
8 6.39 (0.89) 1.18 (0.66) 1.87 (1.49) t(65) = 10.56, p < .001 t(65) = 6.95, p < .001
9 5.76 (1.46) 1.24 (0.69) 1.81 (1.27) t(157) = 12.98, p < .001 t(157) = 8.53, p < .001
10 6.13 (1.51) 1.74 (1.50) 2.29 (1.93) t(434) = 14.55, p < .001 t(434) = 9.80, p < .001
11 5.22 (1.99) 1.38 (0.52) 1.78 (0.97) t(23) = 3.75, p = .001 t(23) = 2.76, p = .011
All participants: neutral
1 1.40 (1.19) 6.37 (1.30) 2.50 (1.91) t(56) = −10.56, p < .001 t(56) = 3.35, p = .001
2 1.27 (0.63) 5.91 (1.48) 1.76 (0.94) t(62) = −15.55, p < .001 t(62) = 6.40, p < .001
3 1.74 (0.87) 5.42 (2.27) 3.17 (1.64) t(53) = −6.21, p < .001 t(53) = 0.85, p = .399
4 1.62 (1.23) 5.54 (1.79) 2.14 (1.07) t(97) = −11.68, p < .001 t(97) = 5.12, p < .001
5 1.71 (1.49) 5.45 (1.77) 3.15 (2.21) t(56) = −6.04, p < .001 t(56) = 0.84, p = .405
6 1.11 (0.33) 4.78 (1.99) 2.17 (1.17) t(21) = −5.40, p < .001 t(21) = 1.21, p = .241
7 1.50 (1.14) 6.64 (1.04) 2.15 (1.19) t(70) = −17.32, p < .001 t(70) = 6.96, p < .001
8 1.43 (0.79) 5.77 (1.72) 2.48 (1.70) t(65) = −10.06, p < .001 t(65) = 3.00, p = .004
9 1.24 (0.59) 6.05 (1.54) 1.67 (1.06) t(157) = −24.14, p < .001 t(157) = 10.33, p < .001
10 1.47 (1.10) 5.42 (1.89) 2.16 (1.47) t(432) = −23.24, p < .001 t(432) = 8.39, p < .001




























1 1.40 (1.10) 1.84 (1.34) 5.85 (1.04) t(56) = 5.50, p < .001 t(56) = −13.21, p < .001
2 1.18 (0.39) 1.45 (1.06) 6.19 (0.75) t(62) = 10.88, p < .001 t(62) = −23.48, p < .001
3 1.32 (0.82) 1.50 (1.19) 5.29 (1.47) t(53) = 5.39, p < .001 t(53) = −11.46, p < .001
4 1.15 (0.36) 2.04 (1.49) 6.03 (0.77) t(97) = 7.41, p < .001 t(97) = −23.59, p < .001
5 1.00 (0.00) 1.14 (0.64) 5.45 (1.67) t(56) = 7.39, p < .001 t(56) = −15.16, p < .001
6 1.00 (0.00) 2.56 (1.74) 6.00 (1.10) t(21) = 1.85, p = .078 t(21) = −7.47, p < .001
7 1.14 (0.35) 1.45 (0.78) 5.93 (0.62) t(75) = 14.12, p < .001 t(75) = −30.88, p < .001
8 1.09 (0.29) 1.91 (1.57) 5.91 (1.04) t(65) = 5.62, p < .001 t(65) = −15.78, p < .001
9 1.47 (0.90) 1.75 (1.27) 5.81 (0.99) t(157) = 10.66, p < .001 t(157) = −23.54, p < .001
10 1.86 (1.50) 1.96 (1.45) 4.97 (1.76) t(435) = 9.03, p < .001 t(435) = −19.21, p < .001
11 1.11 (0.33) 1.62 (1.06) 5.78 (0.67) t(23) = 5.85, p < .001 t(23) = −14.61, p < .001
Conservatives: bitter
1 6.50 (0.71) 1.75 (1.50) 1.50 (0.71) t(5) = 2.56, p = .051 t(5) = 2.54, p = .052
2 6.38 (0.72) 1.23 (0.83) 1.53 (1.18) t(43) = 8.81, p < .001 t(43) = 7.87, p < .001
4 5.50 (1.41) 2.33 (2.16) 2.11 (1.27) t(20) = 1.96, p = .065 t(20) = 2.66, p = .015
5 7.00 (0.00) 1.57 (1.51) 1.00 (0.00) t(9) = 3.32, p = .009 t(9) = 3.38, p = .008
10 5.94 (1.52) 2.12 (1.63) 2.30 (1.84) t(50) = 3.97, p < .001 t(50) = 3.64, p = .001
Conservatives: disgust
1 7.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 4.50 (0.71) t(5) = 21.24, p < .001 t(5) = −1.91, p = .115
2 4.69 (1.66) 1.23 (0.60) 2.18 (1.24) t(43) = 5.26, p < .001 t(43) = 2.00, p = .052



























5 7.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) undefined undefined
10 6.12 (1.27) 1.88 (1.67) 1.50 (1.10) t(50) = 4.80, p < .001 t(50) = 6.55, p < .001
Conservatives: neutral
1 2.00 (1.41) 6.50 (1.00) 2.50 (2.12) t(5) = −4.36, p = .007 t(5) = 1.53, p = .186
2 1.31 (0.70) 5.62 (1.56) 1.65 (0.79) t(43) = −12.16, p < .001 t(43) = 5.71, p < .001
4 1.88 (1.81) 4.67 (2.25) 2.00 (0.71) t(20) = −3.56, p = .002 t(20) = 1.83, p = .082
5 1.00 (0.00) 4.43 (2.07) 4.00 (4.24) t(9) = −1.48, p = .174 t(9) = −0.74, p = .477
10 1.41 (0.71) 5.50 (2.03) 2.32 (1.34) t(49) = −8.37, p < .001 t(49) = 2.74, p = .009
Conservatives: sweet
1 1.00 (0.00) 2.50 (1.73) 6.50 (0.71) t(5) = 1.28, p = .256 t(5) = −4.16, p = .009
2 1.25 (0.45) 1.46 (1.13) 6.24 (0.75) t(43) = 8.74, p < .001 t(43) = −20.01, p < .001
4 1.12 (0.35) 1.83 (1.33) 5.67 (0.71) t(20) = 3.97, p = .001 t(20) = −11.79, p < .001
5 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 3.50 (3.54) t(9) = 1.79, p = .107 t(9) = −2.70, p = .025
10 1.76 (1.20) 1.81 (1.33) 5.50 (0.95) t(50) = 5.27, p < .001 t(50) = −11.35, p < .001
Liberals: bitter
1 5.86 (2.04) 1.60 (1.34) 1.44 (1.01) t(18) = 2.67, p = .016 t(18) = 3.44, p = .003
3 6.42 (0.67) 1.36 (0.48) 1.50 (0.50) t(23) = 10.02, p < .001 t(23) = 9.19, p < .001
4 6.57 (0.75) 1.91 (1.45) 2.31 (1.89) t(42) = 5.43, p < .001 t(42) = 4.34, p < .001
5 7.00 (0.00) 1.50 (1.41) 1.57 (1.13) t(19) = 5.88, p < .001 t(19) = 5.47, p < .001
6 7.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) undefined undefined



























8 6.30 (0.82) 1.40 (1.26) 1.50 (0.76) t(25) = 6.39, p < .001 t(25) = 5.67, p < .001
9 6.17 (1.02) 1.71 (1.47) 1.59 (1.35) t(87) = 7.55, p < .001 t(87) = 8.06, p < .001
10 6.17 (1.38) 1.72 (1.40) 2.64 (1.99) t(328) = 14.28, p < .001 t(328) = 6.94, p < .001
Liberals: disgust
1 6.29 (0.49) 1.00 (0.00) 2.22 (2.05) t(18) = 4.55, p < .001 t(18) = 2.30, p = .034
3 5.75 (1.29) 1.57 (1.13) 1.29 (0.49) t(23) = 3.99, p = .001 t(23) = 4.87, p < .001
4 6.10 (1.41) 1.36 (0.92) 1.92 (1.32) t(42) = 5.90, p < .001 t(42) = 4.21, p < .001
5 6.57 (0.79) 1.00 (0.00) 1.86 (1.46) t(19) = 7.77, p < .001 t(19) = 4.51, p < .001
6 5.33 (1.53) 2.33 (2.31) 1.50 (0.71) t(5) = 0.83, p = .446 t(5) = 1.61, p = .169
7 5.85 (1.60) 1.10 (0.31) 1.86 (1.32) t(59) = 8.36, p < .001 t(59) = 5.00, p < .001
8 6.50 (0.53) 1.00 (0.00) 2.38 (2.00) t(25) = 7.89, p < .001 t(25) = 2.98, p = .006
9 5.70 (1.64) 1.32 (0.75) 1.66 (1.04) t(87) = 8.83, p < .001 t(87) = 6.85, p < .001
10 6.25 (1.35) 1.77 (1.54) 2.30 (1.89) t(328) = 13.36, p < .001 t(328) = 9.13, p < .001
Liberals: neutral
1 1.71 (1.89) 7.00 (0.00) 1.67 (1.00) t(18) = −8.09, p < .001 t(18) = 4.74, p < .001
3 1.50 (0.67) 5.43 (2.07) 2.50 (1.71) t(23) = −5.30, p < .001 t(23) = 1.49, p = .149
4 1.67 (1.28) 6.18 (1.60) 2.31 (0.95) t(42) = −9.36, p < .001 t(42) = 3.77, p < .001
5 2.14 (2.04) 6.12 (1.36) 2.86 (2.19) t(19) = −4.37, p < .001 t(19) = 1.49, p = .153
6 1.33 (0.58) 3.67 (2.08) 1.00 (0.00) t(5) = −2.49, p = .055 t(5) = 1.34, p = .237
7 1.58 (1.22) 6.44 (1.26) 2.10 (1.26) t(53) = −12.47, p < .001 t(53) = 5.55, p < .001



























9 1.30 (0.70) 5.90 (1.87) 1.86 (1.16) t(87) = −14.53, p < .001 t(87) = 5.75, p < .001
10 1.47 (1.09) 5.42 (1.88) 2.11 (1.51) t(327) = −20.27, p < .001 t(327) = 7.55, p < .001
Liberals: sweet
1 1.14 (0.38) 1.60 (1.34) 6.33 (0.71) t(18) = 5.09, p < .001 t(18) = −13.67, p < .001
3 1.42 (1.00) 1.50 (1.32) 5.93 (0.84) t(23) = 4.61, p < .001 t(23) = −9.48, p < .001
4 1.19 (0.40) 1.91 (1.64) 6.31 (0.75) t(42) = 5.62, p < .001 t(42) = −15.19, p < .001
5 1.00 (0.00) 1.38 (1.06) 5.86 (1.21) t(19) = 4.94, p < .001 t(19) = −10.86, p < .001
6 1.00 (0.00) 3.67 (2.31) 7.00 (0.00) t(5) = 0.31, p = .769 t(5) = −3.91, p = .011
7 1.16 (0.37) 1.40 (0.68) 6.00 (0.62) t(58) = 13.83, p < .001 t(58) = −30.67, p < .001
8 1.10 (0.32) 1.60 (1.26) 5.88 (1.36) t(25) = 4.50, p < .001 t(25) = −10.19, p < .001
9 1.43 (0.86) 1.77 (1.33) 5.62 (1.15) t(87) = 6.98, p < .001 t(87) = −15.72, p < .001
10 1.82 (1.48) 1.96 (1.48) 4.90 (1.82) t(329) = 7.51, p < .001 t(329) = −16.22, p < .001
Note. T-test results are reported as “undefined” when there was no variability in ratings for all three beverage groups.
DISGUST AND MORAL WRONGNESS JUDGMENTS 63
Table A4 shows the result of linear mixed-effect regressions examining beverage
ratings across studies.
Knowledge of the Hypothesis
Figure A1 shows predicted probabilities of being partially or fully suspicious as
a function of both beverage type and political orientation obtained in a generalized
linear mixed-effect logistic regression.
Random Effects Meta-Analyses of Raw Mean Differences in Moral
Wrongness
Figures A2 and A3 display raw mean differences and 95% confidence intervals
for each contrast within and across studies across all participants and for conservative
and liberal subgroups. These figures also report estimates of heterogeneity
(Cochrane’s Q, I2, and Tau). The pattern is similar to that shown with standardized
effect sizes. For both contrasts and all subgroups, overall raw mean differences are
small and confidence intervals include zero.
Figures Depicting Moral Wrongness in all Design Cells
Figure A4 plots mean moral wrongness across vignettes for each participant by
beverage type (top panel) and by beverage type and political orientation (bottom
panel). The color of each data point represents study.
Figure A5 plots mean moral wrongness across vignettes for each participant by
beverage type, political orientation, and level of knowledge of the hypothesis.
In both figures, the black vertical lines represent +/- 1 SE around the predicted
estimate (black diamond) after accounting for fixed and random sources of variation




























Linear mixed-effects models examining beverage ratings
bitter disgust neutral sweet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Intercept) 3.276∗∗∗ (0.065) 3.048∗∗∗ (0.076) 3.134∗∗∗ (0.068) 2.910∗∗∗ (0.045)
bitter - control (BvC) 5.808∗∗∗ (0.139) 5.584∗∗∗ (0.139) −3.316∗∗∗ (0.143) −2.941∗∗∗ (0.128)
sweet - control (SvC) −2.600∗∗∗ (0.136) −2.204∗∗∗ (0.136) −1.718∗∗∗ (0.140) 5.283∗∗∗ (0.125)
conservative - liberal (CvL) −0.085 (0.122) −0.164 (0.124) −0.030 (0.126) −0.034 (0.107)
conservative - other (CvO) −0.003 (0.137) 0.106 (0.139) −0.233 (0.141) −0.031 (0.122)
BvC × CvL −0.087 (0.331) −0.296 (0.332) −0.215 (0.341) −0.294 (0.305)
BvC × CvO −0.421 (0.327) 0.234 (0.327) 0.503 (0.337) 0.674∗ (0.301)
SvC × CvL 0.092 (0.378) 0.348 (0.379) 0.657 (0.389) 0.157 (0.348)
SvC × CvO −0.153 (0.372) −0.439 (0.373) −0.042 (0.383) −0.173 (0.342)
Observations 1,132 1,133 1,125 1,133
Log Likelihood −1,996.329 −2,002.325 −2,015.673 −1,904.810
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,014.658 4,026.649 4,053.347 3,831.621
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,070.008 4,082.008 4,108.628 3,886.980
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001





































Figure A1 . Predicted probabilities of being partially or fully suspicious by beverage type
and political orientation obtained in a generalized linear mixed-effect logistic regression. For
beverage type, B = bitter, C = control, S = sweet. For political orientation, C = conservative,
L = liberal, O = other. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval.
One-sided Tests: Small Telescopes Within Studies
For each study, we computed one-sided tests to determine whether the effect for
each of the two contrasts of interest (bitter versus control and bitter versus sweet)
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RE Model (Q(10) = 11.75, p = 0.302; I2 = 12.1%, T = 1.308)
RE Model (Q(4) = 19.63, p = 0.001; I2 = 77.4%, T = 8.347)
RE Model (Q(8) = 24.06, p = 0.002; I2 = 75.6%, T = 7.781)
Figure A2 . Effect sizes (raw mean difference) for the original Eskine et al. (2011) study
(Bitter versus Control) and multiple replications across all participants, and for conservative
and liberal participants subgroups. Within each subgroup, we present studies in descending
order by point estimate. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. RE Model refers to
the overall estimate across replication studies based on a random effects model; it excludes
the original effect size.
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Figure A3 . Effect sizes (raw mean difference) for the original Eskine et al. (2011) study
(Bitter versus Sweet) and multiple replications across all participants, and for conservative
and liberal participants subgroups. Within each subgroup, we present studies in descending
order by point estimate. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. RE Model refers to
the overall estimate across replication studies based on a random effects model; it excludes
the original effect size.




























































Figure A4 . This figure shows mean moral wrongness (y axis) for each participant as a
function of beverage condition (x axis) across (top panel) and within political orientations
(bottom panel). The black vertical lines represent +/- 1 SE around the predicted estimate
(black diamond) after accounting for all modeled sources of variation in Model 1. The color
of each data point represents study.
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Figure A5 . This figure shows mean moral wrongness (y axis) for each participant as a
function of beverage condition (x axis), political orientation, and level of knowledge of the
hypthesis. The black vertical lines represent +/- 1 SE around the predicted mean value
(black diamond) after accounting for all modeled sources of variation in Model 2. The color
of each data point represents study.
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was significantly smaller than the effect size that Eskine et al. (2011) had 33% power
to detect (d33%). Table A5 presents these results, which we summarize below.11
Table A5
Results of one-sided tests of the moral wrongness composite in each
replication study: Is the observed effect size smaller than d33%?
study Bitter versus Control Bitter versus Sweet
All participants
1 t(30.39) = 0.51, p = 0.693 t(33.97) = -0.01, p = 0.495
2 t(41.44) = -1.87, p = 0.034 t(39.33) = -2.7, p = 0.005
3 t(35.13) = -2.02, p = 0.026 t(34.18) = -2.59, p = 0.007
4 t(38.95) = -2.44, p = 0.01 t(72.6) = -3.22, p = < .001
5 t(29.9) = -1.64, p = 0.056 t(29.78) = -0.9, p = 0.188
6 t(12.72) = 0.64, p = 0.734 t(6.98) = 0.79, p = 0.773
7 t(47.09) = -1.62, p = 0.056 t(49.58) = -2.47, p = 0.009
8 t(41.95) = -2.43, p = 0.01 t(39.66) = -2.01, p = 0.026
9 t(103.44) = -3.3, p = < .001 t(102.77) = -2.63, p = 0.005
10 t(286.81) = -2.41, p = 0.008 t(294.31) = -5.86, p = < .001
11 t(12.23) = -0.28, p = 0.393 t(15.79) = -1.21, p = 0.123
Conservatives
1 t(3.8) = 1.96, p = 0.937 t(1.14) = -3.01, p = 0.089
2 t(26.69) = -1.48, p = 0.076 t(26.42) = -4.1, p = < .001
4 t(11.01) = -4.35, p = < .001 t(13.72) = -4.66, p = < .001
5 t(3.17) = -1.1, p = 0.175 t(2.01) = -1.61, p = 0.124
11 Across all participants, Cohen’s d33% = 0.53 for the bitter versus control contrast, and Cohen’s d33% =
0.55 for the bitter versus sweet contrast. For conservative participants, Cohen’s d33% = 0.94 for the bitter
versus control contrast, and Cohen’s d33% = 0.94 for the bitter versus sweet contrast. For liberal
participants, Cohen’s d33% = 0.80 for the bitter versus control contrast, and Cohen’s d33% = 0.80 for the
bitter versus sweet contrast.
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10 t(30.67) = -1.14, p = 0.132 t(34.76) = -1.84, p = 0.037
Liberals
1 t(9.54) = 2.34, p = 0.979 t(13.74) = -0.06, p = 0.477
3 t(13.2) = -1.13, p = 0.14 t(11.52) = -2.63, p = 0.011
4 t(17.66) = -1.85, p = 0.04 t(23.03) = -2.23, p = 0.018
5 t(12.81) = -1.97, p = 0.035 t(8.42) = -2.39, p = 0.021
6 t(3.96) = -0.65, p = 0.275 t(2.04) = 0.68, p = 0.717
7 t(37.13) = -2.5, p = 0.009 t(39.89) = -3.11, p = 0.002
8 t(12.62) = -4.62, p = < .001 t(10.69) = -2.7, p = 0.011
9 t(58.9) = -3.85, p = < .001 t(57) = -2.25, p = 0.014
10 t(214.2) = -4.79, p = < .001 t(217.75) = -7.57, p = < .001
All Participants.
Bitter versus Control.
For the bitter versus control contrast, there were 11 studies to consider. Of
those, 6 suggested that the effect in the replication was significantly smaller than
d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 1 survived Bonferroni correction with alpha = .05 /
11 = .005.
Bitter versus Sweet.
For the bitter versus sweet contrast among all participants, there were 11
studies to consider. Of those, 7 suggested that the effect in the replication was
significantly smaller than d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 2 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 11 = .005.
Conservative Participants.
Bitter versus Control.
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For the bitter versus control contrast among conservative participants, there
were 5 studies to consider. Of those, 1 suggested that the effect in the replication was
significantly smaller than d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 1 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 5 = .010.
Bitter versus Sweet.
For the bitter versus sweet contrast among conservative participants, there were
5 studies to consider. Of those, 3 suggested that the effect in the replication was
significantly smaller than d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 2 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 5 = .010.
Liberal Participants.
Bitter versus Control.
For the bitter versus control contrast among liberal participants, there were 9
studies to consider. Of those, 6 suggested that the effect in the replication was
significantly smaller than d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 3 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 9 = .006.
Bitter versus Sweet.
For the bitter versus sweet contrast among liberal participants, there were 9
studies to consider. Of those, 7 suggested that the effect in the replication was
significantly smaller than d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 2 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 9 = .006.
One-sided Tests: Equivalence Within Studies
We next determined whether the observed effect in each study was equivalent to
0 +/- d33%. Table A6 presents these results; we summarize them below.
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Table A6
Results of one-sided tests of the moral wrongness composite in each
replication study: Is the observed effect size equivalent to 0 +/- d33%?
study Bitter versus Control Bitter versus Sweet
All participants
1 t(30.39) = 0.51, p = 0.693 t(33.97) = -0.01, p = 0.495
2 t(41.44) = 1.63, p = 0.055 t(39.33) = 0.9, p = 0.186
3 t(35.13) = 1.24, p = 0.111 t(34.18) = 0.75, p = 0.23
4 t(38.95) = 1.52, p = 0.068 t(72.6) = 1.55, p = 0.063
5 t(29.9) = 1.58, p = 0.062 t(29.78) = -0.9, p = 0.188
6 t(12.72) = 0.64, p = 0.734 t(6.98) = 0.79, p = 0.773
7 t(47.09) = -1.62, p = 0.056 t(49.58) = 1.48, p = 0.072
8 t(41.95) = 1.11, p = 0.136 t(39.66) = 1.71, p = 0.047
9 t(103.44) = 2.15, p = 0.017 t(102.77) = -2.63, p = 0.005
10 t(286.81) = -2.41, p = 0.008 t(294.31) = 3.59, p = < .001
11 t(12.23) = -0.28, p = 0.393 t(15.79) = 1.12, p = 0.14
Conservatives
1 t(3.8) = 1.96, p = 0.937 t(1.14) = -1.13, p = 0.779
2 t(26.69) = -1.48, p = 0.076 t(26.42) = 1.25, p = 0.11
4 t(11.01) = -0.87, p = 0.8 t(13.72) = -0.75, p = 0.766
5 t(3.17) = -1.1, p = 0.175 t(2.01) = 0.68, p = 0.282
10 t(30.67) = -1.14, p = 0.132 t(34.76) = -1.84, p = 0.037
Liberals
1 t(9.54) = 2.34, p = 0.979 t(13.74) = -0.06, p = 0.477
3 t(13.2) = -1.13, p = 0.14 t(11.52) = 0.67, p = 0.258
4 t(17.66) = -1.85, p = 0.04 t(23.03) = 2.22, p = 0.018
5 t(12.81) = 1.11, p = 0.144 t(8.42) = 0.59, p = 0.286
6 t(3.96) = -0.65, p = 0.275 t(2.04) = 0.68, p = 0.717
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7 t(37.13) = -2.5, p = 0.009 t(39.89) = 2.1, p = 0.021
8 t(12.62) = -1.06, p = 0.846 t(10.69) = 0.57, p = 0.291
9 t(58.9) = 2.37, p = 0.011 t(57) = -2.25, p = 0.014
10 t(214.2) = -4.79, p = < .001 t(217.75) = 4.26, p = < .001
All Participants.
Bitter versus Control.
For the bitter versus control contrast among all participants, there were 11
studies to consider. Of those, 2 suggested that the effect in the replication was
equivalent to 0 +/- d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 0 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 11 = .005.
Bitter versus Sweet.
For the bitter versus sweet contrast among all participants, there were 11
studies to consider. Of those, 3 suggested that the effect in the replication was
equivalent to 0 +/- d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 1 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 11 = .005.
Conservative Participants.
Bitter versus Control.
For the bitter versus control contrast among conservative participants, there
were 5 studies to consider. Of those, 0 suggested that the effect in the replication was
equivalent to 0 +/- d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 0 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 5 = .010.
Bitter versus Sweet.
For the bitter versus sweet contrast among conservative participants, there were
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5 studies to consider. Of those, 1 suggested that the effect in the replication was
equivalent to 0 +/- d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 0 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 5 = .010.
Liberal Participants.
Bitter versus Control.
For the bitter versus control contrast among liberal participants, there were 9
studies to consider. Of those, 4 suggested that the effect in the replication was
equivalent to 0 +/- d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 1 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 9 = .006.
Bitter versus Sweet.
For the bitter versus sweet contrast among liberal participants, there were 9
studies to consider. Of those, 4 suggested that the effect in the replication was
equivalent to 0 +/- d33% with alpha = .05. Of these, 1 survived Bonferroni
correction with alpha = .05 / 9 = .006.
LMER Results for Participants Rating All Six Vignettes
Table A7 shows results for linear mixed-effects regressions examining the
independent and interactive effects of beverage condition and political orientation on
ratings of moral wrongness only among participants who rated all six vignettes.
Study is modeled as a random effect in all.
Estimates in these models are all rather similar in magnitude and direction to
the models that include participants who rated three or more vignettes; none of them
reveal hypothesized elevations of moral wrongness for the bitter group relative to both




























Linear mixed-effects models examining moral wrongness including only participants who rated all six vignettes.
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) 69.858∗∗∗ (0.902) 70.758∗∗∗ (1.030) 70.759∗∗∗ (2.677)
bitter - control (BvC) 3.664∗∗ (1.416) 5.795∗∗ (2.137) 5.795∗∗ (2.137)
bitter - sweet (BvS) −2.157 (1.383) −2.520 (2.250) −2.520 (2.250)
conservative - liberal (CvL) 3.186∗ (1.288) 1.461 (1.853) 1.461 (1.853)
conservative - other (CvO) −2.691 (1.413) 0.782 (2.228) 0.782 (2.228)
Level of Knowledge (0 = naive) 1.140 (1.345) 1.140 (1.345)
BvC × CvL 3.227 (3.396) 7.112 (4.940) 7.112 (4.940)
BvC × CvO 1.783 (3.347) 6.776 (5.191) 6.776 (5.191)
BvS × CvL 1.295 (3.832) −3.864 (5.832) −3.865 (5.833)
BvS × CvO −7.695∗ (3.763) −9.265 (6.243) −9.264 (6.244)
BvC × Knowledge −8.611∗ (3.936) −8.611∗ (3.936)
BvS × Knowledge 3.272 (3.573) 3.272 (3.573)
CvL × Knowledge 5.211 (3.022) 5.211 (3.022)
CvO × Knowledge −3.848 (3.409) −3.848 (3.409)
BvC × CvL × Knowledge −11.302 (8.943) −11.302 (8.944)
BvC × CvO × Knowledge −10.073 (8.244) −10.074 (8.244)
BvS × CvL × Knowledge 0.311 (10.065) 0.311 (10.065)
BvS × CvO × Knowledge 8.444 (9.317) 8.444 (9.317)
Observations 1,047 847 5,082
Log Likelihood −4,223.109 −3,387.079 −23,556.750
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8,468.218 6,814.157 47,157.500
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 8,522.709 6,908.991 47,301.230
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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LMER Results by Vignette
Table A8 shows results for linear mixed effects regressions examining the
independent and interactive effects of beverage condition and political orientation on
ratings of moral wrongness for each vignette separately. Study is modeled as a
random effect in all. None of these models reveal hypothesized elevations of moral
wrongness for the bitter group relative to both the control and sweet groups across
everyone or as a function of political orientation.
Table A9 shows results for two linear mixed effects regressions examining the
independent and interactive effects of beverage condition and political orientation on
ratings of moral wrongness for the average of the two vignettes featuring purity
violations by characters Bob, who has a sexual relationship with his second cousin,
and Frank, who cooks and eats his dead dog. The second analysis echoes the first but
includes level of knowledge of the hypothesis (0 = naive, 1 = partially or fully
suspicious) as an additional fixed effect. Study is modeled as a random effect in both.
Neither model reveals hypothesized elevations of moral wrongness for the bitter group
relative to both the control and sweet groups across everyone or as a function of
political orientation.
Bayes Factors Within Studies
Table A10 shows results for the Bayes Factors tests across all participants, and
for conservative and liberal subgroups for each study. Below we summarize the degree
to which we observed nonanecdotal evidence for and against the replication




























Linear mixed-effects models examining moral wrongness for each of six individual vignettes.
Bob Frank George Arnold Robert Tim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) 58.764∗∗∗ (3.265) 71.755∗∗∗ (1.882) 68.277∗∗∗ (2.046) 78.877∗∗∗ (0.986) 70.541∗∗∗ (1.819) 70.855∗∗∗ (1.731)
bitter - control (BvC) 1.603 (3.089) 4.516 (2.827) 3.660 (2.440) 1.063 (1.970) 4.663 (2.415) 4.604 (2.386)
bitter - sweet (BvS) −4.279 (3.040) −5.662∗ (2.761) −2.739 (2.384) 1.770 (1.920) −0.882 (2.364) −0.434 (2.328)
conservative - liberal (CvL) 2.115 (2.852) −2.204 (2.563) 2.084 (2.229) −1.832 (1.738) 7.151∗∗ (2.195) 8.181∗∗∗ (2.165)
conservative - other (CvO) −5.078 (3.139) −3.281 (2.833) 0.096 (2.473) 1.285 (1.947) −2.409 (2.438) −1.713 (2.401)
BvC × CvL −5.634 (7.403) 8.303 (6.760) 2.538 (5.828) 0.775 (4.704) 8.196 (5.775) 3.369 (5.699)
BvC × CvO −0.144 (7.333) −6.112 (6.648) 2.525 (5.730) 2.914 (4.614) 5.452 (5.688) 5.378 (5.600)
BvS × CvL −2.760 (8.391) 7.834 (7.661) 0.524 (6.617) 0.542 (5.349) −9.088 (6.560) 2.501 (6.471)
BvS × CvO 1.105 (8.277) −14.201 (7.549) −2.624 (6.547) −4.242 (5.251) −8.078 (6.472) −11.283 (6.373)
Observations 1,089 1,117 1,125 1,130 1,132 1,129
Log Likelihood −5,263.426 −5,302.797 −5,181.533 −4,961.170 −5,208.594 −5,176.015
Akaike Inf. Crit. 10,548.850 10,627.590 10,385.070 9,944.339 10,439.190 10,374.030
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 10,603.780 10,682.800 10,440.350 9,999.669 10,494.540 10,429.350
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
79DISGUST AND MORAL WRONGNESS JUDGMENTS
Table A9
Linear mixed-effects models examining moral wrongness for the average of the two purity 
violation vignettes.
(1) (2)
(Intercept) 65.176∗∗∗ (2.062) 65.314∗∗∗ (2.559)
bitter - control (BvC) 3.255 (2.307) 1.565 (3.478)
bitter - sweet (BvS) −5.103∗ (2.265) −6.091 (3.677)
conservative - liberal (CvL) 0.017 (2.129) −3.873 (3.041)
conservative - other (CvO) −4.838∗ (2.330) −0.112 (3.652)
Level of Knowledge (0 = naive) 3.417 (2.192)
BvC × CvL 1.591 (5.527) 4.691 (8.045)
BvC × CvO −3.106 (5.465) −7.438 (8.461)
BvS × CvL 3.525 (6.252) 1.301 (9.486)
BvS × CvO −7.090 (6.159) −5.577 (10.139)
BvC × Knowledge −6.254 (6.278)
BvS × Knowledge 7.023 (5.819)
CvL × Knowledge 11.195∗ (4.901)
CvO × Knowledge −6.983 (5.531)
BvC × CvL × Knowledge −23.594 (14.325)
BvC × CvO × Knowledge 12.481 (13.429)
BvS × CvL × Knowledge −8.960 (16.225)
BvS × CvO × Knowledge 9.846 (15.197)
Observations 1,074 873
Log Likelihood −4,868.599 −3,925.406
Akaike Inf. Crit. 9,759.197 7,890.812
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 9,813.968 7,986.250




























Results of Bayes Factors tests of the moral wrongness composite in each replication study.
Bitter versus Control Bitter versus Sweet
study JZSBayes RepBayes EffectSizeBayes MetaBayes JZSBayes RepBayes EffectSizeBayes MetaBayes
All participants
1 1.63 4.69 2.91 59.38 0.82 0.98 1.48 43.49
2 0.22 0.04 0.34 0.74 0.32 0.01 0.04 0.39
3 0.25 0.04 0.27 0.63 0.35 0.01 0.05 0.47
4 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.34 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.20
5 0.24 0.06 0.44 0.99 0.31 0.11 0.62 5.84
6 1.03 3.31 2.92 37.82 1.08 3.24 2.63 108.74
7 0.21 0.06 0.50 1.08 0.23 0.01 0.07 0.49
8 0.27 0.02 0.16 0.38 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.92
9 0.18 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.48
10 0.76 0.27 0.54 5.27 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.04
11 0.43 0.65 1.95 8.52 0.32 0.08 0.50 3.95
Conservatives
1 2.83 14.08 1.81 959.11 1.18 0.03 0.10 1.46
2 0.42 0.02 0.09 4.43 0.59 0.00 0.02 0.13



























5 0.43 0.03 0.24 5.22 0.54 0.06 0.41 2.41
10 0.70 0.05 0.13 11.30 0.37 0.04 0.22 2.21
Liberals
1 11.72 18.70 0.72 9.42 0.81 2.11 2.56 3.24
3 0.37 0.66 2.39 0.51 0.47 0.13 0.52 0.21
4 0.27 0.38 2.04 0.29 0.26 0.16 1.10 0.31
5 0.37 0.34 1.43 0.24 0.48 0.15 0.60 0.26
6 0.49 0.82 2.08 0.58 0.99 2.43 1.76 3.16
7 0.23 0.27 1.78 0.20 0.25 0.09 0.69 0.16
8 5.05 0.38 0.11 0.07 0.51 0.12 0.47 0.20
9 0.25 0.17 1.16 0.09 0.26 0.25 1.50 0.53
10 0.19 0.27 2.13 0.25 0.39 0.07 0.36 0.03
Note. JZSBayes = Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow (JZS) Bayes Factor; RepBayes = Replication test Bayes Factor; EffectSizeBayes =
equality-of-effect-size Bayes Factor; MetaBayes = fixed-effect meta-analysis Bayes Factor.
DISGUST AND MORAL WRONGNESS JUDGMENTS 82
All Participants. There were 11 studies for the contrasts in this section.
Bitter versus Control.
For the JZS prior, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis (i.e., BF10 > 3) and 7 provide nonanecdotal support for the
null hypothesis (i.e., BF10 < 1/3).
For the replication prior, 2 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis (i.e., BF10 > 3) and 8 provide nonanecdotal support for the
null hypothesis (i.e., BF10 < 1/3).
For the equality-of-effect-size approach, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis, signaling replication of original results (i.e., BF01 > 3)
and 4 provide nonanecdotal support for the alternative hypothesis, signaling
nonreplication of original results (i.e., BF01 < 1/3).
For the fixed-effect meta-analysis approach, 4 Bayes factors provide
nonanecdotal support for the replication hypothesis (i.e., BF10 > 3) and 1 provides
nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis (i.e., BF10 < 1/3).
Bitter versus Sweet.
For the JZS prior, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 8 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
For the replication prior, 1 Bayes factor provides nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 9 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
For the equality-of-effect-size approach, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis, signaling replication of original results and 7 provide
nonanecdotal support for the alternative hypothesis, signaling nonreplication of
original results.
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For the fixed-effect meta-analysis approach, 4 Bayes factors provide
nonanecdotal support for the replication hypothesis and 2 provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis.
Conservative Participants. Turning to the conservative subgroup, there
were 5 studies for contrasts in this section.
Bitter versus Control.
For the JZS prior, 1 Bayes factor provides nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 0 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
For the replication prior, 1 Bayes factor provides nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 4 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
For the equality-of-effect-size approach, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis, signaling replication of original results and 4 provide
nonanecdotal support for the alternative hypothesis, signaling nonreplication of
original results.
For the fixed-effect meta-analysis approach, 4 Bayes factors provide
nonanecdotal support for the replication hypothesis and 1 provides nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis.
Bitter versus Sweet.
For the JZS prior, 1 Bayes factor provides nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 0 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
For the replication prior, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 5 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
For the equality-of-effect-size approach, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis, signaling replication of original results and 4 provide
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nonanecdotal support for the alternative hypothesis, signaling nonreplication of
original results.
For the fixed-effect meta-analysis approach, 0 Bayes factors provide
nonanecdotal support for the replication hypothesis and 2 provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis.
Liberal Participants. Finally, turning to the liberal subgroup, there were 9
studies for the contrasts in this section.
Bitter versus Control.
For the JZS prior, 2 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 4 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
For the replication prior, 1 Bayes factor provides nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 3 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
For the equality-of-effect-size approach, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis, signaling replication of original results and 1 provides
nonanecdotal support for the alternative hypothesis.
For the fixed-effect meta-analysis approach, 1 Bayes factor provides
nonanecdotal support for the replication hypothesis and 6 provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis.
Bitter versus Sweet.
For the JZS prior, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 3 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
For the replication prior, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal support for the
replication hypothesis and 7 provide nonanecdotal support for the null hypothesis.
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For the equality-of-effect-size approach, 0 Bayes factors provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis, signaling replication of original results and 0 provide
nonanecdotal support for the alternative hypothesis, signaling nonreplication of
original results.
For the fixed-effect meta-analysis approach, 2 Bayes factors provide
nonanecdotal support for the replication hypothesis and 6 provide nonanecdotal
support for the null hypothesis.
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